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The Act does not speak in terms of "sophisticated" as opposed to "unsophisticated" people dealing in securities. The rules when the giants
play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market.
-Justice

William 0. Douglas'

The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors of judgment.
-Judge Irving R. Kaufman 2

INTRODUCTION

A fundamental idea in American jurisprudence is that like cases
should be treated alike, and different cases should be treated differently.
Another is that the law should treat all individuals identically, regardless
of their wealth or status. These principles-one based on evenhandedness and the other on individual dignity-come into conflict when the
law must apply to individuals with multiple characteristics, only some of
which distinguish these individuals from one other. In such cases, the
law must determine whether these differences are legally significant
(evenhandedness prevails) or insignificant (individual dignity prevails).
These cases frequently arise under the securities laws when courts decide
whether to treat sophisticated and unsophisticated investors differently.
Investors possess vastly different degrees of financial sophistication.
Some are institutional investors or professionals with vast resources, educations from top business schools, and substantial investment experience.
Others are individuals with few resources, little or no education, and
even less experience in the securities markets. Although, as Justice
Douglas has correctly remarked,3 the securities laws themselves make
almost no mention of investor sophistication, 4 courts do in fact distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.
In some cases, plaintiffs' sophistication actually bars recovery. 5 A
1. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2. -irsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. See supra text accompanying note 1.

4. The definition of "accredited investor" in section 2(15) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1982), is a notable exception. See infra notes 236-77 and accompanying text (dis-

cussing treatment of sophisticated investors in connection with registration exemptions).
5. See, e.g., Hirsch, 553 F.2d at 762-63 (finding for defendants, largely because of plaintiffs'
position in securities industry); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brooks, 548 F.2d 615,

616 (5th Cir.) (no liability for violation of margin rules where plaintiff was sophisticated investor),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp.

591, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (summary judgment for defendant on sophisticated plaintiffs' churning,
suitability, and margin violation claims); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 486

F. Supp. 56, 58 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (summary judgment under statute of limitations because sophisticated plaintiff should have discovered fraud earlier); Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1064 (S.D.
Tex. 1978) (holding for defendant, largely because of plaintiffs' sophistication); Scarfarotti v. Bache
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court of appeals, in one case, adjudged a plaintiff's claim frivolous in
view of the plaintiff's sophistication, and awarded attorney's fees to the
defendant. 6 In other cases, courts have remarked on the plaintiffs' sophistication and eventually held for the defendants, but have failed to
7
indicate how investor sophistication influenced their decisions.

One might draw several alternative conclusions from such cases.

Perhaps sophistication affects case outcomes subtly, silently, and without
judicial knowledge. Or, perhaps judges feel that sophistication should

count against plaintiffs, but are unable to articulate a justification for this
feeling. One might even conclude that sophisticated investors simply

make less credible witnesses, particularly if they try to present themselves
as poor, innocent, unsophisticated victims." The troublesome aspect of
these cases is that neither the courts nor the commentators have articulated a coherent theory to justify different judicial treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors-the kind of theory that might
resolve the inconsistency and confusion in this area. This Article seeks
to develop such a theory.
As part I demonstrates, based on a comprehensive study of cases
involving investor sophistication, the federal courts' treatment of investor
sophistication reflects a doctrine in disarray. The problem arises in more
than a dozen different types of cases arising under the Securities Act of
1933 (the 1933 Act) 9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act),10 yet the courts' treatment of sophisticated investors shows little
& Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 203-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding for defendant in Rule 1Ob-5 case, largely
because of plaintiffs' sophistication); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 288-90 (E.D.
La. 1974) (holding for defendant on plaintiff's action under 1933 Act section 12(2) and Rule lob-5
where plaintiff was "sophisticated and knowledgeable investor"), aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975);
C. Leonardt Improvement Co. v. Southdown, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (preliminary injunction denied when court, noting plaintiffs' investment experience, remained unconvinced of plaintiffs' ability to succeed at trial); cf North Am. Fin. Group v. S.M.R. Enters., 583 F.
Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. 111.1984) (common law securities fraud claim dismissed because of plaintiff's
sophistication, among other reasons).
6. Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1986). For an interesting discussion of this case and some recommendations concerning its use by litigators, see Note, Turning the
Tables: Investor Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 17 STETSoN L. REv. 196 (1987).
7. See, eg., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1193 (3d Cir. 1979); Abell v. Elmer, [19851986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,448, at 92,728 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 1985); Gascogne Corp. v. Miceli, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,924, at 90,703
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1981); Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan & Co., 309 F. Supp. 849, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
8. See, e.g., Scarfarotti 438 F. Supp. at 203-05 (finding that plaintiffs were experienced investors and that their contrary claims were strong evidence of untruthful testimony); Sandor, 309 F.
Supp. at 853 (basing decision in part on "demeanor evidence" after finding plaintiff was
sophisticated).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
10. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
Although this Article comprehensively surveys the judicial treatment of sophisticated investors
under the federal securities laws, the survey is necessarily incomplete. The Article focuses on the
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coherence or, if you will, reflects little cross-fertilization among the different settings in which the sophistication issue arises. In addition, even
within each context, courts often disagree strongly whether investor sophistication is relevant at all. If the law is to draw distinctions between

legal actors and thereby downplay individual dignity, 1 it must explain
why those distinctions are (or should be) legally relevant. Part II of this

Article provides such an explanation. It presents a set of five propositions, which together lead to the conclusion that a court may properly
treat sophisticated investors differently from other investors when the
claim at issue involves either explicit congressional permission or a judicially created right of action. Finally, an appendix to this Article
presents a set of criteria that both judges and lawyers may use in determining an investor's level of sophistication.
I.

THE INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT
OF SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS

Many cases arising under the 1933 and 1934 Acts involve the issue
of investor sophistication. While the larger jurisprudential problem-

justifying a legal distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors-is common to all, the legal contexts of these cases vary. The
following sections discuss these contexts one at a time.
A.

Investor Sophistication and the Causation Requirement
of Rule 10b-5.

Rule lOb-5 has generated a staggering quantity of law.12 Yet, surprisingly enough, the cases demonstrate little precision or unanimity regarding the elements of a prima facie Rule lOb-5 case. 13 Almost all
1933 and 1934 Acts; however, the principles discussed apply to other areas of securities law in which
the issue of investor sophistication arises.
11. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
12. At least two multivolume treatises are now devoted primarily to Rule lOb-5. See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWELFELS, SECURrrIEs FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1979); A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 (2d ed. 1988).
13. See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must show
that defendant, in connection with purchase or sale of securities, falsely represented material fact on
which plaintiff justifiably relied to her detriment); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017, 1026 (6th Cir. 1979) (Rule lOb-5 elements: use ofjurisdictional means, deceptive or manipulative practice committed with scienter in connection with purchase or sale of security; causation;
damages); HSL, Inc. v. Daniels, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,557, at
97,194-95 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1983) (same); Issen v. GSC Enters., 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (10b-5 elements: material misrepresentation, omission, deception, or manipulation; scienter;
causal connection to plaintiff's harm); see also Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule
10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96, 99 n.17 (1985)
(10b-5 elements: purchaser or seller; materiality; scienter; connection with purchase or sale; reliance; causation; jurisdictional means).
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formulations, however, require causation: in a private damage action
under the Rule, a defendant's acts must bear a causal connection to a
14
plaintiff's injury.
Perhaps no aspect of Rule lOb-5 has perplexed as many people as
this causation requirement. 15 Although courts agree that the Rule requires some sort of causal connection, they agree on little else and take a
variety of approaches to the requirement. 16 Some courts wrestle with it
under the rubric of reasonable reliance 17 or due diligence,18 while others

treat it in terms of reckless reliance or in pari delicto.19 The task in all
four approaches is the same: establishing a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury. 20 Moreover, regardless of which
approach a court uses, the issue of investor sophistication arises.
1. Reasonable Reliance and the Sophisticated Investor. In Rule
lOb-5 cases involving misrepresentations of material fact, courts most
commonly decide the causation issue by considering whether the plaintiff
14. See, eg., cases cited supra note 13.
15. Several authors have made helpful attempts to sort out this confusion. See Helman, Rule
10b.5 Omissions Cases and the Investment Decision, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1982); Wheeler,
Plaintiff'sDuty ofDue Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy, 70 Nw.
U.L REv. 561 (1975); Note, Reliance Under Rule 10b-5: Is the "ReasonableInvestor"Reasonable?,
72 COLUM. L. REv. 562 (1972).
16. The problem is exacerbated by potential confusion of the causation element with two related, yet distinct, elements of Rule lOb-5: the materiality and "in connection with" requirements.
Both are separate from the causation element and should not be confused with it. Materiality requires that the information given or withheld be of some importance to the investor at issue. Wheat
v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1976); cf TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (defining materiality in Rule 14a-9 action). Although the relevance of an investor's sophistication to the materiality issue remains an open question, see infra notes 89-104 and accompanying
text, the materiality of information is unaffected by allegations of harm. That is, material misrepresentations or omissions need not cause harm. Of course, in nondisclosure cases, courts presume
causation if material omissions exist. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 15354 (1972); Helman, supra note 15, at 403-06.
The "in connection with" requirement is likewise distinct from the causation requirement. The
Rule's "in connection with" language demands that a plaintiff show some connection between the
defendant's alleged misconduct and the purchase or sale of securities, whereas the causation requirement demands that a plaintiff show some connection between the misconduct and the harm he has
allegedly suffered.
17. See infra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
20. This fact has eluded at least one court. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157 (1987). The Flamm court declared that justifiable reliance is no
longer an element in a Rule lob-5 case, since the causation and materiality requirements serve the
same function. The court apparently misunderstood that justifiable reliance constitutes apartof the
causation element. For an excellent discussion of the causation element and the relevance of plaintiffs' conduct in Rule lob-5 actions, see Gabaldon, Unclean Hands andSelf-Inflicted Wounds" The
Significance of Plaintiff Conduct in Actions for Misrepresentation Under Rule IOb-S, 71 MNN. L.
REV. 317 (1986).
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has reasonably relied on the defendant's misstatements. 2 1 In cases involving nondisclosure of material facts, since the facts show nothing on
which the plaintiff could have relied, courts shift the burden of proof to
the defendant: the plaintiff's showing of material nondisclosure establishes causation 22 and the defendant can prevail only by showing that the
plaintiff would have made the same investment if full disclosure had occurred.2 3 Thus, in both affirmative misrepresentation and nondisclosure
cases, courts use reliance to determine causation, 24 and under that approach, a plaintiff's lack of reasonable reliance will cause her Rule lOb-5
25
claim to fail.
21. See, e.g., HSL, Inc. v. Daniels, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
99,557, at 97,195 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 1983) (Rule lOb-5's causation element usually satisfied by
showing of reliance); Capital Invs., Inc. v. Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534, 539 n.1 (E.D.
Wis. 1977) (same), aff'd, 577 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1978); cf Painter, Civil Liability Under the Federal
Proxy Rules, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 425, 426 (1986) (courts continue to require reliance in Rule 10b-5
cases, except in cases involving pure nondisclosure).
22. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972). The inference of
causation from materiality in nondisclosure cases has led one commentator to suggest, a little misleadingly, that materiality may satisfy the causation requirement in the same way that reliance and
due diligence do. See Helman, supra note 15, at 402-08. Under a proper reading of Affiliated Ute,
materiality is important for causation purposes simply because its presence in a nondisclosure case
raises a rebuttable presumption of causation. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154.
23. See, eg., duPont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,
468 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). These cases rebut others that have misread
Affiliated Ute as making reasonable reliance (and therefore, presumably, causation) irrelevant in
nondisclosure cases. See Little v. First Cal. Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,745, at 96,466 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1974) (rejecting defendants' contention that plaintiff
had to plead reliance in nondisclosure case); see also McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 F.R.D. 357,
363 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (suggesting that at certification stage of class action, due care and reliance are
irrelevant, and only materiality is important).
24. This may not hold true for Rule lOb-5 claims brought under a fraud on the market theory.
Under this emerging theory, a plaintiff's showing of reliance on the general integrity of the market
satisfies the causation element. See, e.g., Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %92,298, at 92,024-26 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 1985); see also Branson,
CollateralParticipantLiability Under the Securities Laws-Chartingthe Proper Course, 65 OR. L.
REV. 327, 335 (1986) (suggesting that reliance requirement in lOb-5 cases is waning because of fraud
on market theory). But see Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931-32 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (indicating that even in fraud on market cases, sophisticated plaintiffs held to higher standard of justifiable
reliance (quoting J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 998-99 (7th Cir.
1980))). For a cogent description of the fraud on the market theory and its application, see Note,
The Fraudon the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 10b-5Action, 70
IowA L. REv. 975 (1985). The theory relies on a canonical theory of market efficiency that has
recently come under attack. See, eg., Gordon & Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 789-94 (1985) (suggesting that reliance on an
efficient-market hypothesis may be unwise, since validity may depend on sophistication of actors
involved); Donnelly, Efficient-Market Theorists Are Puzzled by Recent Gyrations in Stock Market,
Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 7, col. 1 (reporting views of those criticizing efficient-market
hypothesis).
25. See Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1983); Stem & Stem Textiles, Inc. v. LBY. Holding Corp., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,122, at
95,522 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1987); Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438 F. Supp. 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
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In conducting the reasonable reliance inquiry, most courts have recognized the relevance of investor sophistication. In Zobrist v. Coal-X,
Inc., for example, the Tenth Circuit pointed to "the sophistication and
expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters" as one of
eight factors that a court should consider in determining a plaintiff's reasonable reliance. 26 The court then noted that the plaintiff was a "sophisticated and knowledgeable investor,"' 27 and held his reliance
unreasonable as a matter of law. 2 8 Similarly, in Kennedy v. Josephthal &
Co., the First Circuit, citing Zobrist, listed a number of factors that affect
the reasonable reliance inquiry. 29 Based on the plaintiffs' sophistication,
the court held that the plaintiffs could not havejustifiably relied on any
alleged misrepresentations and affirmed summary judgment for the
30
defendants.
Zobrist and Kennedy typify a long line of cases in which courts have
found background,3 1 education, 32 special expertise, 33 and general investment sophistication 34 relevant to the reliance inquiry. These cases
clearly imply that the relevance inquiry is a subjective one, 35 and most
courts that have considered the issue agree. 36 Some courts, however,
1984) (dismissing
ef North Am. Fin. Group v. S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698-99 (N.D. Ill.
common law fraud claim because of plaintiff's failure to establish reasonable reliance on alleged
misstatements).
26. 708 F.2d at 1516. For a similar list, see Note, supra note 15, at 567-75.
27. Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1517.
28. Id. at 1518.
29. 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987).

30. Id. at 805.
1984)
31. See, e.g., North Am. Fin. Group v. S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill.

(background as venture capitalist supported finding of sophistication).
32. See, e.g., Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (education among factors leading court to conclude that reliance unjustified), aff'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1227 (1988); S.MR. Enters, 583 F. Supp. at 698 (same).
33. See S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. at 698 ("The background, special expertise or education of
the plaintiff also may be considered incident to the reasonable reliance element.").
34, See, e.g., J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 989-99 (7th Cir.
1980) (sophisticated investor may not be as justified in relying on material misrepresentation or
omissions as others would be); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976) (sophistication worthy of consideration); Platsis, 642 F. Supp. at 1299 (in view of plaintiffs' sophistication,
court not persuaded that reliance justified); Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Co., 631 F. Supp. 860,
891 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (sophistication relevant to plaintiff's degree of reliance); Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 596 F. Supp. 797, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sophistication relevant to determine plaintiff's reliance); S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. at 698 (venture capital firm's sophistication relevant).
35. Cf Helman, supra note 15, at 408 (terming duty of due diligence "subjective and flexible").
36. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 737 (8th Cir. 1967), cerL denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). But cf
Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 116-17 (D. Conn. 1978) (refusing to hold sophisticated investor to higher, "hypothetical reasonable man" due diligence test).
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have taken a contrary position. 37 Instead of analyzing plaintiffs' sophistication under a subjective test, these courts ignore sophistication and treat
all investors alike as stereotypical "reasonable men." 38 Such inconsis-

tency in approach necessarily leads to inconsistent judicial treatment of
sophisticated investors under Rule lOb-5.
Under a subjective test, a sophisticated plaintiff faces a higher standard of reliance. For example, in Weinberg v. Lear Fan Corp., 9 the
court considered the merits of a proposed class action settlement 4° in a
Rule lOb-5 action by a group of educated professionals. 4 1 The court held
the settlement fair to the class members because their sophistication created a high probability of failure on the merits; under a reasonable reli-

ance test, their sophistication made it less likely that they could prove
causation. 42 Similarly, in Eichen v. E.F.Hutton & Co., the court held the

plaintiff-a longtime investor in speculative ventures and a former mutual fund advisor-to a higher level of scrutiny as it evaluated his claim
that he relied on alleged misrepresentations about the safety of an oil and
gas program. 4 3 The court decided that his sophistication undercut his
reliance claim.44

Other cases imply a higher standard of reasonable reliance. Many
courts simply note a plaintiff's sophistication and suggest that he gain37. See, eg., Note, supra note 15, at 566-67 (noting that some courts use objective test to determine reasonable reliance, while others use subjective test).
38. See, eg., In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 92,461, at 92,819 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 13, 1985) (rejecting defendant's affirmative defense
that sophisticated plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence, since sophistication irrelevant under federal securities law); Abbott Mortgage, 459 F. Supp. at 116-17 (refusing to hold sophisticated investor
to higher standard of due diligence under objective test).
39. 627 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
40. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), a court must approve all class action settlements.
41. Weinberg, 627 F. Supp. at 723. The plaintiffs were a group of doctors, lawyers, educators,
and business people. This Article's appendix, see infra notes 386-419 and accompanying text, considers what factors may or may not count in determining an investor's sophistication.
42. Weinberg, 627 F. Supp. at 723; see also Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804
(1st Cir. 1987) (holding sophisticated plaintiff to higher reasonable reliance standard); Zobrist v.
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1983) (same); Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,
477 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931-32 (N.D.
Ind. 1984) (same); Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHi. L. REv.
824, 842 (1965) ("[R]ecovery would be denied to those who, because of their 'business sophistication,' acumen, or ready access to the information involved, could reasonably be expected to exercise
a higher degree of care and investigation in their dealings."); cf. Fisher v. Plessy Co., 103 F.R.D.
150, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (reporting defendants' argument that plaintiff should not represent class
because his sophistication would subject him to unique defense of lack of justifiable reliance).
43. 402 F. Supp. 823, 830-31 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
44. Id. at 830; see also Kohner v. Wechsler, 477 F.2d 666, 673 n.1l (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J.,
concurring) (plaintiff's sophistication may make him unable to prove reliance); Model Assocs. v.
United States Steel Corp., 88 F.R.D. 338, 340 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (sophisticated investor may be expected to rely less on any alleged misrepresentations than unsophisticated investor would).
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bled, lost, and is unfairly asking for compensation.4 5 As the court in
Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp. stated, "the securities laws are not to be used
as an insurance policy for investors who choose voluntarily to disregard
facts which would have been uncovered by any reasonable person in their
position."46
Sophistication, then, often reduces an investor's ability to show reasonable reliance. As a result, a sophisticated investor often faces a more
difficult task of establishing causation under Rule lOb-5 than an unsophisticated one faces. 47
2. Due Diligence and the Sophisticated Investor. In analyzing
Rule lOb-5 causation issues, courts often state that investors may not
simply close their eyes to obvious risks, but must exercise due diligence
in protecting themselves. 4 8 In considering whether a sophisticated investor has exercised such diligence, courts use an analysis similar to the
reliance inquiry, although the relationship between due diligence and reasonable reliance is elusive.4 9 In one view, due diligence charges plaintiffs
with a duty to take affirmative steps to protect themselves, while reasonable reliance merely admonishes plaintiffs to be reasonable in their passive reliance. 50 A better analysis, however, suggests that any distinction
between due diligence and reasonable reliance is insubstantial. Rather,
45. See, eg., Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594
(SD.N.Y. 1981) (granting summary judgment for defendant, since plaintiff was sophisticated investor with full knowledge of securities' speculative nature and failed to object until venture failed);
Eichen, 402 F. Supp. at 830 (plaintiff's "level of sophistication and investment experience is significant and is not compatible with his claims of reliance" on alleged misrepresentations); Canizaro v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. La. 1974) (no liability under section 12(2) or Rule
lOb-5, in part because plaintiff was "sophisticated and knowledgeable investor" who must have
known risk in buying stock for well below market price), aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975); cf.
Gleit v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,799,
at 90,887 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1976) ("The scenario of the disappointed-but not defrauded-investor, who tries to recover his loss through means of the federal securities laws, has become all too
common in the federal courts.").
46. (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,446, at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
1976) (emphasis added). The court had already decided to take the plaintiff's sophistication into
account in determining the reasonableness of his investigation.
47. Many cases hold sophisticated investors to a higher standard of due diligence as well. See
infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); North Am. Fin. Group v.
S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. II. 1984); Eichen, 402 F. Supp. at 831; cf Buder v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 644 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff could not deliberately close eyes to facts that average, reasonable person, let alone sophisticated investor, would
have discovered, and then hope to toll statute of limitations).
49. See Wheeler, supra note 15, at 570-89 (tracing confusion regarding causation, reasonableness of reliance, and due care).
50. One commentator has suggested that judicial emphasis after Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), is moving away from reasonable reliance and toward due diligence. See Helman, supra note 15, at 407, 408.
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both doctrines attempt to express the same idea about causation: for a
plaintiff to recover, a defendant's acts, not the plaintiff's, must have
51
caused the plaintiff's alleged injury.
Perhaps because of the two doctrines' resemblance,5 2 most courts
agree that the due diligence test, like the reasonable reliance inquiry, is
subjective: these courts measure due diligence not by what an ordinary
reasonable plaintiff would have done, but by what the plaintiff at bar
should have done under the circumstances. 5 3 Some courts hold sophisti54
cated and unsophisticated investors to the same due diligence standard.

This disparity necessarily leads to inconsistent judicial treatment of the
sophisticated investor.
As with the reliance inquiry, courts using a subjective due diligence
test hold sophisticated plaintiffs to a higher level of scrutiny.5 5 In Mc51. See Wheeler, supra note 15, at 563 ("The gist of what might be called the lack of due care
defense is simply that rule lOb-5 does not remedy private losses which are demonstrated to be, at
least in part, the result of the plaintiff's own carelessness."); see also Helman, supra note 15, at 408
(suggesting that due diligence requirement is based on idea of reasonable reliance). The relationship
between these causation concepts in securities law and more general notions of contributory fault,
comparative fault, and proximate cause, while fascinating, is beyond the purview of this Article.- At
least one court has noted the similarity between Rule lOb-5's due diligence requirement and the tort
concept of contributory negligence. See McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del.
1976).
52. The connection between the two becomes most apparent in the cases that interpret Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), as shifting the causation inquiry's focus from due diligence
to reckless reliance. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 988 (1971); see also Helman, supra note 15, at 408 (plaintiff's duty of due diligence is "subjective and flexible" and depends on plaintiff's sophistication); Note, The Due Diligence Requirement
for Plaintiffs Under Rule lOb-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753, 768 [hereinafter Note, Due Diligence Requirement] ("[Tihe due diligence burden of experienced investors may be higher than that of insiders who
lack such expertise."). See generally Note, Due Diligence: A Post-Sale ofBusiness Doctrine Method
ofAvoiding Rule 10b-5 Liability, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 589 (1986) (suggesting that sellers of corporate
stock can avoid Rule lOb-5 liability by using due diligence or justifiable reliance defenses, both almost always available because of typical purchasers' sophistication).
As one commentator has pointed out, a subjective due diligence requirement can cause
problems for a plaintiff seeking to represent a class in a class action, since a sophisticated plaintiff
may have trouble satisfying this element of the Rule lob-5 action. See Marcus, FraudulentConcealment in FederalCourt: Toward a More DisparateStandard?,71 GEO. L.J. 829, 881 (1983). Typicality problems for the sophisticated investor in class actions are discussed infra notes 182-210 and
accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., In re Olympic Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) $ 92,461, at 92,819 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1985) (plaintiff's sophistication irrelevant in
securities fraud cases; no graduated scale of duty depending upon sophistication); Long v. Abbott
Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 116-17 (D. Conn. 1978) (refusing to apply higher standard of
diligence to plaintiff, even though plaintiff a sophisticated investor).
55. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545
F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); Colvin v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,
477 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (5th Cir. 1973); McAlpine, 434 F.2d at 103-04; Bourdages v. Metals Ref.
Ltd., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 91,828, at 90,169 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
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Lean v. Alexander,56 the court addressed due diligence in these terms:
Whereas the test of materiality requires that the information be objectively important to a reasonable person, the duty of due care mandates
that the plaintiff assess the information as would a person similarly
possessed of his degree of business expertise. Thus, the duty to investigate the facts surrounding a securities transaction which attaches to
the sophisticated
investor is greater than the corresponding duty of a
57
novice.
Accordingly, sophisticated investors may not simply close their eyes to
facts relevant and obvious to them, only to claim later that ordinary investors would nct have discovered those facts at all.58 If, by virtue of his
sophistication, a plaintiff has access to material information but fails to
examine it, then his Rule lOb-5 claim must fail under a subjective due
diligence test.59 The court's admonition in Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp.
applies in this context as well: "the securities laws are not to be used as
an insurance policy for investors who choose voluntarily to disregard
facts which would have been uncovered by any reasonable person in their
31, 1984); McLean, 420 F. Supp. at 1078; Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,446, at 99,242-43 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1976); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 830 (S.D. Cal. 1975); see also Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross,
472 F. Supp. 402, 408-09 (D. Colo. 1979) (using high level of due diligence for statute of limitations
purposes in lOb-5 case), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Comment,
supra note 42, at 842 ("In this way recovery would be denied to those who, because of their 'business
sophistication,' acumen, or ready access to the information involved, could reasonably be expected to
exercise a higher degree of care and investigation in their dealings."); Note, Due Diligence Requirement, supra note 53, at 768 ("[TIhe due diligence burden of experienced investors may be higher
than that of insiders who lack such expertise."). See generally Marcus, supra note 53, at 879-80
(arguing in favor of individualized standard of due diligence in statute-of-limitations cases).
56. 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
57. Id. at 1078.
58. See, eg., Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 644 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir.
1981) (plaintiff may not deliberately close eyes to information that would demonstrate to any reasonable person that representations could not have been true); Hirsch, 553 F.2d at 763 ("The securities
laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their own errors ofjudgment."); see
also duPont v. Brady, 646 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("sophisticated investors may not
intentionally refuse to investigate the information available to them"), rev'd, 828 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1987); cf North Am. Fin. Group v. S.M.R. Enters., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (same
holding in common law fraud case).
59. See, e.g., Holdsworth, 545 F.2d at 692 (insider must fulfill duty of due care in ascertaining
information before claiming reliance on material misrepresentation); NBI Mortgage Inv. Corp. v.
Chemical Bank, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,066, at 91,801 (S.D.N.Y.
May 24, 1977) (plaintiff cannot claim reliance if he failed to exercise due diligence); Eichen, 402 F.
Supp. at 830 ("investor who casually makes investments, and who blindly rides bubbles until they
burst, does so at his own risk, and cannot later invoke [section] 10(b)" (quoting McGraw v. Matthaei, 388 F. Supp. 84, 92 (E.D. Mich. 1972))); Nexus Indus. v. Smith, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,379, at 98,891 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1975) (available information should
have led reasonable and sophisticated investor to conclusion that company was in severe financial
trouble).
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position."60
A minority of courts, however, have rejected this subjective approach and its distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. In Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., the court applied an objective
standard to a sophisticated investor's claim. 61 In In re Olympic Brewing
Co. SecuritiesLitigation,62 the court rejected a defendant's argument that
plaintiffs, sophisticated investors who had full access to all relevant information, caused their own injury through a lack of diligence:
The sophistication of the investor is immaterial when it comes to plaintiffs' claims based upon misrepresentations and omissions.... Moreover, § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 does not establish a
graduated scale of duty depending upon the sophistication and access
to information of the customer. Thus, whether or not plaintiffs were
sophisticated investors has no bearing on whether or not they can sus63
tain a cause of action under the applicable federal securities laws.
Thus, in due diligence analysis, as in reliance analysis, courts fail to agree
on the relevance of investor sophistication, and this leads to inconsistent
results.
3. Sophisticated Investors and Reckless Reliance. One line of
Rule lOb-5 cases demonstrates judicial ambivalence about the role of investor sophistication in causation inquiries and illustrates the connections between due diligence and reasonable reliance. The line follows
from Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, in which the Supreme Court held that
Rule lOb-5 requires that plaintiffs prove scienter. 64 After Hochfelder,
some courts began to reconsider whether plaintiffs should have to prove
their due diligence as well as the defendant's scienter.65 For example, in
Holdsworth v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs must prove
both due diligence and scienter only for negligent misrepresentation
60. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,446, at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
1976). The court had already determined that the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor who should
have exercised a higher level of diligence than that of other investors. Of course, even a sophisticated

plaintiff can establish due diligence, notwithstanding the higher level of care required. See, eg.,
Verace v. New York Stock Exch., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 97,575, at
98,043 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1980) (notwithstanding plaintiff's sophistication, he did not lack "due
diligence" in relying on representation).
61. 459 F. Supp. 108, 116-17 (D. Conn. 1978). The court, however, found that the plaintiff had
not met even that lower standard. See id. at 117.
62. [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 92,461 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 13, 1985).
63. Id. at 92,819 (citations omitted).
64. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
65. See generally Marcus, supra note 53, at 875 n.290 (noting that courts disagree whether due
diligence defense exists after Hochfelder); Note, Plaintiff's Duty of Care After Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 158, 159 (1978) (reporting and discussing circuit split regarding
Hochfelder's effect on due diligence requirement).
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claims. 66 According to the court, for claims under Rule lOb-5 or theories

of fraudulent misrepresentation, if the plaintiff proves scienter, the defendant should not prevail simply by showing the plaintiff's lack of due
diligence: "If contributory fault of plaintiff is to cancel out wanton or
intentional fraud, it ought to be gross conduct somewhat comparable to
'67
that of defendant."

Other courts have decided that Hochfelder mandates no change in
the due diligence requirement. 68 One interesting set of cases, however,

holds that Hochfelder shifts the causation burden of proof to defendants.
These cases suggest that a plaintiff need not prove due diligence to estab-

lish a prima facie Rule lOb-5 claim; rather, the defendant may allege the
plaintiff's reckless reliance as an affirmative defense. 69 The cases define
reckless reliance as action in disregard of a known and obvious risk.70 By

also allowing defendants to show reckless reliance, this approach opens
up the possibility that courts would hold sophisticated plaintiffs to a

higher standard than unsophisticated plaintiffs.
Thus, even if Hochfelder has merged reliance and due diligence, in-

vestor sophistication remains of central concern in the majority of cases.
No matter how Rule lOb-5's causation element is expressed, a majority
of courts consider investor sophistication relevant to their analysis of
causation. 7 1 Despite this agreement, however, they have articulated no
theory that will clarify and justify the role of sophistication and will produce consistent results.

4. SophisticatedInvestors and the In Par!Delicto Defense. Under
the in pari delicto doctrine, a plaintiff cannot recover damages if his own
conduct is the primary cause of his alleged injury. 72 Some judges have

argued that sophisticated plaintiffs make particularly appropriate targets
66. 545 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
67. Id. at 692. But see McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976)
(Hochfelder did not destroy due diligence requirement, since even under that case, a showing of
knowledge or recklessness may support a IOb-5 action).
68. See, eg., Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 762 (2d Cir. 1977).
69. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977);
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1976); Stem & Stem Textiles, Inc. v. LBY
Holding Corp., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %93,122, at 95,521 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

3, 1987).
70. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 185 (5th ed. 1984); Mallis v.
Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 1980); Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020 (citing Prosser); Stern &
Stern, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,521 (citing Dupuy).
71. See, eg., Stern & Stern, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,521 & n.5
(noting that investor sophistication relevant to some issues in securities fraud cases, but not relying
on sophistication in case at hand); McLean, 420 F. Supp. at 1078 (permitting defendant to establish
sophisticated plaintiff's lack of due diligence).
72. See generally Gabaldon, supra note 20, at 343-61.
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for an in pan delicto defense, 73 a view consistent with the caselaw's general tendency to hold sophisticated investors to a high level of scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, however, in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards,Inc. v.
Berner, recently limited the defense's availability. 74 The Bateman Court
held that a tipper cannot assert an in pari delicto defense against a tippee
who sues under Rule lOb-5 for a misleading tip unless: (1) the tippeeplaintiff bears substantially equal responsibility for the alleged violation,
and (2) preclusion of the plaintiff's suit would not interfere with effective
enforcement of the securities laws. 75 Bateman's second requirement will
make the defense unavailable to many tipper-defendants, who will have
difficulty showing that their exoneration would comport with effective
enforcement of the securities laws. Sophistication may still be important
even under this rule, however, since sophisticated plaintiffs will more
likely bear "substantially equal responsibility" for the violations they
seek to redress.
Thus, investor sophistication plays a prominent role in all four approaches to Rule lOb-5 causation, but the nature of this role remains
unclear. In order to alleviate this confusion, we must establish uniform
guidelines for the proper treatment of investor sophistication in cases involving causation issues under Rule lOb-5. Part II of this Article takes
up that task.
B. Investor Sophistication and Other Elements of Rule 10b-5.
A plaintiff's sophistication also affects other elements of a Rule 1Ob5 claim. As the Rule prescribes: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not
76 Whether a defendant has misrepresented "facts," as
misleading .... ,,
the Rule requires, may depend on the sophistication of the investor hear73. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 808 F.2d 252, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1986) (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Brooks,
548 F.2d 615, 615-16 (5th Cir.) (rejecting argument that "sophisticated commodities futures investor
who at all times possessed knowledge of his deficient margin account status . . . should not be
required to pay back any indebtedness because the extension of'credit violated a rule or regulation of
the Chicago Board of Trade"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 87-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding for defendant where plaintiff, a sophisticated
investor, knowingly and intentionally induced defendant to violate Regulation U), aff'd, 409 F.2d
1360 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). But see Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d
1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970) (permitting investor in pad delicto to assert claim despite his windfall),
cert denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (same).
74. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
75. Id. at 310-11.

76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1988).
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ing the alleged misrepresentations. 7 7 Similarly, an investor's sophistication may influence a court's decision about the materiality of facts
allegedly misstated or omitted. 78 Some courts also find investor sophistication relevant in deciding whether facts were "misleading," or "deceptive."'79 Finally, many courts find sophistication relevant in omissions
80
cases when they consider the adequacy of a defendant's disclosure.
1. "Facts" and the Sophisticated Investor. Occasionally, a defendant asserts that an alleged misstatement was nonfactual and therefore provides no basis for a Rule lOb-5 action.81 In such circumstances,
the plaintiff's sophistication becomes relevant. In Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., for example, the Second Circuit held that corporate officers'
misrepresentations that "1972 was expected to be a good year," when
communicated to a sophisticated investor, were not "facts" under Rule
lOb-5.8 2 Presumably, the court left open the possibility that the statements at issue could be "facts" if communicated to a less sophisticated
investor. In Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,83 the Ninth Circuit
hinted at the same conclusion in deciding that the generality of the defendant's representations blocked any Rule lOb-5 violation. The plaintiff's sophistication had an influence on this decision: as the court
remarked, the plaintiff was not a "gullible, defenseless investor unable to
protect himself from the machinations of a vastly superior opposite
84
party."
Both Elkind and Hughes are troubling, though, not because they
suggest that a plaintiff's sophistication alters the analysis of "facts"
under Rule lOb-5, but because they fail to present any reason for distinguishing sophisticated investors from "gullible, defenseless" investors.
Why is sophistication relevant to courts? In particular, how does it affect
whether representations are facts under Rule lOb-5?
In Smith v. Sade & Co., 85 the court indicated a possible answer to
these questions by demonstrating a connection between this "fact" re77. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
81. Of course, Rule 10b-5(b)'s proscription against misstatements and omissions is not the only
aspect of the Rule that can serve as the basis for a claim. A plaintiff can also allege that a defendant

employed a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or has engaged in an "act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5(a), (c).
82. 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
84. Id. at 177.
85. [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,846 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982).
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quirement and the reliance inquiry. The Sade & Co. plaintiffs were quintessential "highly sophisticated investors"8 6 who had suffered heavy
losses in options markets and then sued their broker for Rule lOb-5 violations and common law fraud. They complained that the broker had
made positive performance claims that constituted fraudulent misrepresentations of fact. The court, however, rejected this argument, reasoning
in part that the plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied on such a performance claim: "While defendants may have expressed optimism as to
their ability to perform. . . , reliance by a sophisticated investor such as
[the plaintiff] on such expressed optimism, which may be characterized
as 'puffing,' is insufficient to sustain an action for fraud." 87
As this holding indicates, investor sophistication decreases the
probability that courts will view defendants' claims as misrepresentations
offact, rather than mere "puffing." 8 8 Yet, courts tend to make this characterization partly because a sophisticated plaintiff would not reasonably
rely on such statements. Thus, in Rule lOb-5 cases involving sophisticated investors, courts entangle the fact requirement with reasonable reliance analysis. This approach results in unsatisfying, unprincipled, and
almost incoherent caselaw. A general theory that justifies disparate judicial treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors is necessary
to clarify these cases as well.
2. Materiality and the Sophisticated Investor. In both misrepresentation and omission cases, a Rule lOb-5 claim requires a plaintiff to
prove the materiality of misstated or omitted facts.8 9 At first blush, the
relation between investor sophistication and materiality should allow for
no controversy, given the Supreme Court's classic definition of materiality in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.90 The Northway standard for
materiality requires
a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonableshareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial
86. Id. at 94,338. One was a former United States Ambassador with substantial business experience and degrees from Harvard and Yale; the other, a self-employed business consultant and former goverment official. Both subscribed to the Washington Post and Barron's and met regularly

with an account executive to discuss their financial planning. As the court found, they understood
the securities markets generally and the specific principle that risk and return go together. Id. at
94,361-62.
87. Id. at 94,365.
88. That courts will characterize brokers' performance claims as "puffing," however, remains
only probable. See, eg., Lukovich v. E.F. Hutton & Co., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) %92,701, at 93,413-14 (D. Or. Apr. 21, 1986) (broker's assurances not "mere puffery"
in light of investor's interest).
89. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1988).
90. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available. 9 1
This language seems to envision an objective standard, and some
courts agree. 92 Indeed, at least one court has held investor sophistication
irrelevant precisely because of the inquiry's objectivity. 93 Nonetheless,
other courts have suggested that sophistication may have some bearing
on the issue of materiality. In SEC v. Shapiro,94 the defendants, accused
of illegal insider trading under Rule lOb-5, claimed in defense that they
were trading on immaterial information. The court, however, suggested
that the proof was in the pudding: the fact that the financially sophisticated defendants invested soon after receiving the information showed its
95
materiality.
In addition, recent cases decided under the antifraud provisions of
the Commodities Exchange Act9 6-a statute whose antifraud provisions
are analogous to Rule lOb-5 97-suggest the importance of investor sophistication in materiality analysis. In Herman v. T & S Commodities,
Inc., a commodities fraud action, the court considered a commodities
investor's sophistication in deciding the materiality issue. 98 The court
characterized the materiality test as "partly subjective," but apparently
confused materiality with causation, since it asked whether the plaintiff
would have acted any differently had the defendant not acted wrongfully.99 Although it remains unclear how this confusion colored the
court's interpretation of the materiality requirement, the court did also
note that the plaintiff's sophistication made him a difficult mark for an
unscrupulous broker. °0
Although Herman raises more questions than it answers, it provides
support for a subjective interpretation of the materiality requirement,
which would open the door to considerations of investor sophistication.
91. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976).
93. See Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Under Rule IOb-5, the test of
materiality is 'whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented .... '
Even sophisticated investors are entitled to the protections of this rule." (quoting John R. Lewis,
Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted))).
94. 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974).
95. Id. at 1307.

96. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
97. Section 4b of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982), proscribes
fraud and imposes liability for misleading statements and omissions by commodities market makers.
A private right of action for these violations exists. Id. § 25; see also Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982) (recognizing implied private right of action under CEA).
98. 592 F. Supp. 1406, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1410-11.
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In addition, the Northway definition of materiality does not preclude a
subjective test in Rule lOb-5 cases. Northway defined materiality as an
objective inquiry in the context of the proxy fraud rules, not Rule lOb5.101 Even in the context of the proxy fraud rules, the Northway standard
is not necessarily a purely objective one. In speaking of the "responsible
shareholder," the Court left open the possibility that the reasonable investor should have theplaintif'scharacteristics. Although this definition
ordinarily applies in Rule lOb-5 cases as well,10 2 proxy fraud cases present a stronger justification for an objective standard than do Rule lOb-5
cases. In proxy fraud cases, a plaintiff need not prove that the fraudulent
statement or omission was actually significant to her, but only that the
voters as a whole would have found the statement or omission significant 10 3 A lOb-5 plaintiff, however, must show that the statement or
omission misled him personally.104 Thus, even if proxy fraud cases require a purely objective inquiry, 10 5 Rule lOb-5 cases do not.
In short, the relevance of investor sophistication to materiality remains unclear, and this area of Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, like the others,
cries out for clarifying principles.
3. Deceptiveness and the Sophisticated Investor. Except in cases
of manipulation, each of Rule lOb-5's three subsections requires some
sort of deception.1 0 6 Whatever the requirement, deception cannot occur
in a void; it presupposes an object of deception, an investor who is misled. Because the nature of that object changes from case to case (some
investors are less gullible than others), we should not be surprised to find
that courts construe the requirement differently depending on the sophistication of the investor-or, if you will, the object-involved. Thus, in
PierreJ. LeLandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., a case arising under Rule
lOb-5 and the proxy rules, the court held that the plaintiffs' sophistication made it impossible to characterize a proxy statement as deceptive. 107
The LeLandais court did not, however, address the sophistication of
other investors who received the proxy materials. If these investors were
not sophisticated, the court could have characterized the materials as
101. See Northway, 426 U.S. at 449.
102. See, eg., Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1976).
103. See, e.g., Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,269 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977).
104. On the requirement of actual reliance, see supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text. A
fraud on the market theory eliminates this requirement, however. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977).
107. 387 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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"deceptive" with respect to them. Or, perhaps the court meant to require that the plaintiffs prove their own subjective deception, which be-

gins to sound like the subjective reliance test discussed above.10 8 In
summary, the LeLandais court expressly considered investor sophistication but failed to elaborate a theory that would explain the relevance of
investor sophistication to the deceptiveness requirement. The case's

treatment of the sophisticated investor issue is, unfortunately, typical.
4. Adequacy of Disclosure and the Sophisticated Investor.

In se-

curities transactions, Rule lOb-5 prohibits omission of material facts necessary to make a statement not misleading.10 9 Less than total disclosure

can still be adequate, though, as long as complete disclosure would not
have altered the plaintiff's conduct. 1 10 In many cases, adequacy of disclosure may turn on the sophistication of the party to whom disclosure is

made; as the Eighth Circuit has stated, "there is no duty to disclose information to one who reasonably should already be aware of it." '

Thus, the purpose of the disclosure requirement defines the contours of
the requirement: Rule lOb-5 requires "nothing more than the disclosure

of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own evaluative expertise in reaching their own investment decisions." 11 2
Reasoning that sophisticated investors can draw upon "their own

evaluative expertise" more easily than can others, many courts consider
investor sophistication in determining a disclosure's adequacy.113 For
example, in Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., the court stated: "Sophisticated investors are entitled to the protection of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Rule lOb-5. However, the
108. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b); see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151
(1972); Little v. First Cal. Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,745, at
96,466 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1974).
110. See, e.g., duPont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987) (no lOb-5 liability if defendant
proves "by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of [the material information at issue]
would not have altered the plaintiff's investment decision").
111. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), quoted
with approvalin Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
112. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); see also Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1904) (stating, in land fraud case,
that "[w]hen the means of knowledge are open and at hand or furnished to the purchaser or his
agent.., he will not be heard to say that he has been deceived to his injury by the misrepresentations

of the vendor").
113. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Bollo, 560 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (2d Cir. 1977);
Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Quintel Corp. v.
Citibank, N.A., 596 F. Supp. 797, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Caan v. Kane-Miller Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,446, at 99,242 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1976). But see Stier
v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum) (sophistication irrelevant to question of
adequacy of disclosure).
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sophistication of [the plaintiff] is relevant to the adequacy of disclosure,
and the extent of the reliance of [the plaintiff] on any alleged misrepre-

sentation ....114 Other courts have held disclosure to sophisticated
investors adequate as a matter of law. In Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical
Co. v. Bollo, the court rejected the plaintiff's complaint that the defendant failed to alert him to certain provisions in the corporation's supply
contracts, reasoning that the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor and
had full access to all of the corporation's relevant books and records.1 15
Another case, Martin v. Steubner, typifies a slightly different, but
consistent, line of cases. In Martin, the plaintiff had represented himself
as sophisticated when signing a subscription agreement;1 16 as a result, the
court held that the defendant lacked scienter because he had assumed the
plaintiff was sophisticated. 17 That holding necessarily implies that the
disclosure would have been adequate if the plaintiff had actually been
sophisticated.
Not all courts, however, find investor sophistication relevant to the
adequacy issue. In the oft-cited case Stier v. Smith, the plaintiff had
purchased $50,000 worth of stock as part of an initial offering in Mickey
Mantle's Country Cookin', Inc., which became worthless not long after
the purchase.1 18 The plaintiff sued the corporation's founder under Rule
lOb-5, alleging numerous omissions of material fact. The trial court
found fourteen undisclosed facts, but held the disclosure adequate for
four reasons: the plaintiff was financially sophisticated; he knew that the
corporation had filed a registration statement; a prospectus was available
upon request; and he had failed to conduct any investigation.1 19 The
Fifth Circuit reversed, however, issuing the much-repeated epigram that
"sophisticated investors, like all others, are entitled to the truth." 120 The
court decided, without performing any meaningful analysis, that the defendant had a duty to disclose the omitted facts and that the plaintiff's
sophistication like the plaintiff's failure to ask for any information or
114. 596 F. Supp. at 797, 801-02 (citations omitted).
115. 560 F.2d at 1091-92. This is not to say, of course, that a seller discharges a disclosure

obligation merely by making all records, no matter how voluminous, available without any assistance. See Caan, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,242 (obligations imposed by Rule lb-5 not discharged by simply making company records available and requiring
other party to sift out material facts).
116. 485 F. Supp. 88, 92-93 (S.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd, 652 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1148 (1982). The plaintiff flew in unannounced, wore a conservative gray suit, said that he
was in the oil business, knowledgably discussed partnerships and tax shelters, and indicated that his

income was three times his investment. Id. at 91-92, 97.
117.
118.
Mantle
119.
120.

Id. at 97.
473 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1973). As baseball fans will be pleased to learn, Mickey
merely lent his name to the enterprise; he was not named as a defendant.
See id.
Id.
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examine the available prospectus, was irrelevant to that duty.121 Interestingly, although the court claimed to agree with the trial court's factual
finding that the plaintiff was sophisticated, it did recite the weak evidence
of sophistication that appeared in the record; the weakness of this evidence may well have influenced the court's decision. 122 Thus, its pronouncement aside, the Fifth Circuit may implicitly recognize the
relevance of investor sophistication to the issue of adequate disclosure.
The caselaw in this area illustrates the courts' inconsistent approaches in dealing with sophisticated investors. Without guiding principles, courts are simply unable to determine the relevance of investor
sophistication in Rule lOb-5 actions.
C.

Churningand the SophisticatedInvestor.

Churning involves brokers' excessive trading in customers' accounts
for the purpose of generating brokerage commissions. 123 As the Fourth
Circuit describes: "Churning occurs when a broker, exercising control
over the volume and frequency of trading, abuses his customer's confidence for personal gain by intitiating transactions that are excessive in
view of the character of the account. Its hallmarks are disproportionate
turnover, frequent in and out trading, and large brokerage commissions."1 24 The caselaw holds that churning violates Rule l0b-5.12 5 To
raise a churning claim under the Rule, a plaintiff must prove that a broker: (1) traded excessively in light of the plaintiff's investment objectives; (2) had control over that trading; and (3) had scienter, defined as
either an intent to defraud or willful and reckless disregard of the plaintiff's investment interests. 126
121. Id. at 1208-09.
122. See id. at 1207 & n.2.
123, See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURmES REGULATION 705 (2d ed. 1988); Note,
Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 869, 869 (1967).
124. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975).
125. See, e.g., Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 (7th Cir. 1983); Thompson
v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1416 n.3 (l1th Cir. 1983); Follansbee v.
Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,
324 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
126. See, eg., Arceneaux v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 767 F.2d 1498, 1501
(11 th Cir. 1985); Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1983); Follansbee,
681 F.2d at 676; Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1391, 1392 (D.
Md. 1986); Smith v. Sade & Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) t 98,846, at 94,363
(D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982). Some courts, however, have formulated the elements of churning slightly
differently. In Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Okla. 1975), for
example, the court listed three general ideas relevant to an evaluation of a churning claim: (1)
whether excessive trading had occurred in the account at issue; (2) whether the defendant intended
to advance his own interests by generating commissions; and (3) whether the plaintiff was relatively
uninformed and therefore relied on the broker's competence. Id. at 379; see also Costello, 711 F.2d
at 1368 n.8 (courts have suggested that customer must also be unsophisticated). For an extensive
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It has been said that churning is an evil that only a sophisticated
investor would recognize; 127 not surprisingly, investor sophistication is a
recurring theme in churning cases. Sophisticated investors' churning
12 8
claims almost always fail.
Courts have found investor sophistication relevant to the second element of a churning claim, broker control. If a broker has actual discre129
tion to trade in an account, that clearly satisfies the control element.
But a broker's de facto control also suffices: if the investor relies on the
130
broker in making trading decisions, that reliance will establish control.
As the court in Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 131
discussed, a number of factors-including investor sophistication-indicate de facto control:
In determining whether a broker has assumed control of a non-discretionary account the courts weigh several factors. First, the courts examine the age, education, intelligence and investment experience of the
customer. Where the customer is particularly young, old, or naive
with regard to financial matters, the courts are likely to find that the
broker assumed control over the account. Second, if the broker is socially or personally involved with the customer, the courts are likely to
conclude that the customer relinquished control because of the relationship of trust and confidence. Conversely, where the relationship
between the broker and the customer is an arms-length business relationship, the courts are inclined to find that the customer retained control over the account. Third, if many of the transactions occurred
without the customer's prior approval, the courts will often interpret
this as a serious usurpation of control by the broker. Fourth, if the
customer and the broker speak frequently with each other regarding
the status of the account or the prudence of a particular transaction,
introduction to the law of churning and the role that plaintiffs' sophistication plays in it, see Note,
Customer Sophisticationand a Plaintiff'sDuty of Due Diligence: A ProposedFrameworkfor ChurningActions in NondiscretionaryAccounts Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1986).
127. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 947 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 611 F.2d 450 (3d
Cir. 1979).
128. See, eg., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 n.10 (1st Cir.), cert denied,
414 U.S. 1002 (1973); see also Note, DueDiligence Requirement, supra note 53, at 768 (sophisticated
investors are often charged with knowledge of information; in case of churning, monthly statements
should put even minimally sophisticated plaintiffs on notice of fraud). Courts may also deny recovery when a plaintiff's agent or advisor is sophisticated, even if the plaintiff is not. See, eg., Ocrant v.
Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974) (churning claim where plaintiff's agent (and
husband) was active trader and licensed broker); Marshak, 413 F. Supp. at 381 (sophistication of
plaintiff's agent bars churning claim). Sophistication does not, however, always disable an investor
from recovering. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
129. See, eg., Tiernan, 719 F.2d at 4 n.2 ("Indeed, even a sophisticated investor who blindly
relinquishes all decisions to a broker may not be in control of his account."); Follansbee, 681 F.2d at
676 ("If a broker is formally given discretionary authority to buy and sell for the account of his
customer, he clearly controls it.").
130. See, eg., Tiernan, 719 F.2d at 3; Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 676-77.
131. 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
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the courts will usually find that the customer, by maintaining such an
active interest in the account, thereby maintained control over it.132
Since even a sophisticated investor can allow a broker to make all the
decisions in an account, sophistication alone does not preclude a finding
of actual broker control. 133 Except in exceptional circumstances, however, an investor's sophistication generally prevents a finding that a broker had de facto control of an account.
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co.,
"[t]he touchstone [of de facto control] is whether or not the customer has
sufficient intelligence and understanding to evaluate the broker's recommendations and to reject one when he thinks it unsuitable."1 34 The court
thus examined the indicia of the plaintiff's sophistication: he had a college degree in economics and had taken an accounting course; he regularly read and understood financial reports and investment newsletters;
he participated actively in investment seminars and kept meticulous
records of his trades. These characteristics distinguished the Follansbee
plaintiff from the stereotypical churning victim, such as a widow with no
business experience or financial acumen.1 35 In the court's assessment,
the plaintiff's background marked him as "a person in complete control
136
of his account."'
The Follansbee opinion also limited an earlier Ninth Circuit case to
its facts. In Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., the court had written that
"the requisite degree of control is met when the client routinely follows
132. Id. at 954-55 (citations omitted); see Costello, 711 F.2d at 1368 n.8; S. JAFFE, BROKERDEALERS AND SECURriEs MARKETs 308 (1977); see also Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1391, 1394 (D. Md. 1986) (quoting Lieb).
133. See, e.g., Tiernan, 719 F.2d at 3; Costello, 711 F.2d at 1368 n.8.
134. 681 F.2d at 677; see also Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access," "Investment

Sophistication," and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 25 (1980) (gist of inquiry
into customer sophistication in churning cases is whether customer understood what broker was
doing); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 381 (N.D. Okla. 1975) ("[T]he
Court must determine whether the investor is sc. ,informed that the stock broker is in a position to
manipulate the account and perpetrate fraud on the unwary investor or whether, on the other hand,
the investor is knowledgeable enough to warrant holding him responsible for the maintenance of his
own affairs.").
135. Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677.
136. Id. at 678. In Marshak; 413 F. Supp. at 381, the court found the following indicia of
sophistication and concluded that the customer in that case retained control over his account:
(1) he began trading in 1958, thirteen years prior to the conduct complained of;
(2) he had maintained several brokerage accounts over the years;
(3) he was a member of a stock investor's club;
(4) he subscribed to the Wall Street Journal;
(5) he kept track of his investments with his broker almost daily by phone and went to the
broker's office three to five times per month; and
(6) he received confirmation slips and monthly statements.
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the recommendations of the broker." 13 7 Such a test would allow many

more sophisticated investors to recover on churning claims, since even
many sophisticated investors in full control of their financial affairs follow their brokers' advice. In response, Follansbee cautioned against construing Mihara to mean "that the most sophisticated investor is not in
control of his account simply because he usually follows the recommen13 8
dations of his broker."
In other cases involving the issue of broker's control, courts have
held that sophisticated investors who have received confirmation slips
from their brokers are estopped to complain about activity in their accounts. In Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 139 for example, the court
barred a churning claim in the following terms:
Given plaintiff's obvious experience in the stock market, we hold as a
matter of law that he must have realized the inconsistency between his
alleged investment intent and what was actually occuring in his account; he is therefore estopped from arguing, for purposes of his
churning claim, that he was an investor rather than a trader.140

In considering the control element of churning claims, then, courts
have found investor sophistication relevant. Like the cases in other con-

texts, however, the churning cases lack a cogent explanation of the criteria that should guide the analysis of control questions. Many courts

seem to compensate for the absence of such an explanation by developing
long lists of attributes of sophistication, but these courts have failed to

explain convincingly or comprehensively the legal principles that make
the listed attributes relevant. 141 This lack of a firm theoretical basis for
what seem like reasonable rules of law compromises the legitimacy of
those rules.
137. 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (considering whether evidence would supportjury finding
of control).
138. Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677; see also Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3
n.2 (1st Cir. 1983) (limiting Mihara to its facts).
139. 473 F.2d 365 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002 (1973).
140. Id. at 373-74; see also Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854, 858-59 (10th Cir. 1974)
(holding that action by sophisticated investor who regularly receives information about account and
fails to object seasonably may be barred under doctrines of waiver, estoppel, laches, or ratification);
cf Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 376-77 (S.D. Tex.
1965) (investor who received confirmations of trades and did not object for 11 months barred from
asserting fraud and negligence claims); Ellwood v. Mid States Commodities, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 174,
182 (Iowa 1987) (holding that knowledgeable investor ratified unauthorized commodities trades by
failing to object to conurmation slips).
141. See, eg., Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373-74 & n.10 (1st Cir. 1973)
(accepting, without explanation, trial court's finding of control, but providing long explanation why
account not overtraded); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 956
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (listing plaintiff's personal characteristics that supported finding of no usurpation
of control); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 381 (N.D. Okla. 1975)
(denying churning claim because of plaintiff's background and control of account).
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D. Sophisticated Investors and Non-Rule lOb-5 Suits Against BrokerDealers.
Claims by disappointed and allegedly defrauded customers account
for a sizable percentage of lawsuits filed against brokerage firms., We
have already seen some of these, such as Rule lOb-5 actions for misrepresentations 142 and for churning, 143 but there are others, and investor sophistication affects the outcomes in many of them as well. Specifically,
courts find sophistication relevant in actions alleging violations of margin
rules and so-called "suitability" rules.
1. Margin Rules Violations and the Sophisticated Investor. Section 7 of the 1934 Act creates a complex system for regulating extensions
of credit, or margin use, in securities transactions. 144 Most importantly,
section 7(a) delegates to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to regulate "the amount of credit that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security." 1 45 For brokers and their
customers, the most important of these regulations is Regulation T,
which prohibits the extension of credit on marginable securities beyond a
certain percentage of those securities' value. 146 Violations of these limits
often return to haunt a broker in the course of litigation. Customers may
point to margin violations offensively, after losing a large sum of money
on a highly leveraged position created on borrowed money, 147 or defensively, against a collection action by a broker whom a customer has failed
8
to pay following such a loss. 14 1
In analyzing a margin violation claim, courts often examine a customer's sophistication. In fact, in Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner
& Smith, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that a sophisticated investor had
no private right of action for Regulation T violations.149 Although the
court rejected a private right of action for any plaintiff, it also stated that
the plaintiff at bar, who was neither "small" nor "inexperienced," 150
142. See supra notes 12-122 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 123-41 and accompanying text.

144. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982).
145. Id.
146, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.130 (1988). For a concise description of the Board's entire regulatory scheme, see T. HAZEN, ThE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 10.11, at 287-89 (1985).
147. See, e.g., Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir.
1979); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1975); McCormick v. Esposito, 500
F.2d 620, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975).
148. See, eg., Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,760, at 96,498 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974) (simultaneous actions by brokerage firm for
deficiency and by customer for losses).
149. 603 F.2d at 1088-93.
150. Id. at 1093. The court noted the following indicia of the plaintiff's sophistication: he was a
doctor with a very large practice of his own; his wife had a Ph.D.; he also owned a family corpora-
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151
could not have recovered even if a private right of action did exist.
The court derived this conclusion from the same reasoning that other
courts had used to permit private rights of action in prior cases. This
rationale focused on a tort doctrine that allows recovery for violations of
a statutory duty if and only if the plaintiff falls within the class whose
interests the relevant statute seeks to protect.15 2 The Stern court assumed, without support, that the margin requirements exist solely to protect unsophisticated investors from becoming overextended.1 53 In fact,
Congress also originally authorized such requirements to protect securities markets from the instability of highly leveraged positions and the
economy from too great a diversion of its credit resources.1 54 Although
the court deserves commendation for its effort to justify a distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, its rationale rests on a
faulty premise. 155
Margin violation claims by sophisticated plaintiffs have failed in
most other cases as well. 156 Indeed, one commentator has even recommended that margin rules should not apply to sophisticated investors,
presumably because such investors can protect themselves against the
risks of excess leverage.15 7 Margin violation cases, however, consistently
tion with extensive real estate holdings; his salary was very high; and he had been a stock and
options trader for nearly 20 years, had traded hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of options, and
had made all his own investment decisions. Id at 1093-97.
151. Id. at 1097.
152. Id. at 1075-76 (discussing Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949),
a case that ultimately allowed recovery for a plaintiff outside the class that Congress intended that
margin requirements protect); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (the tort
doctrine at issue).
153. Stern, 603 F.2d at 1076.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 1 SECURITIES LAW
COMM., FED. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL SECURITES LAW: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1933-1982, at 794,
801 (1983); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), reprintedin, 1 SECURITES LAW COMM.,
FED. BAR ASS'N, supra, at 708-10.
155. For more defensible justifications, see infra notes 315-84 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., McCormick v. Esposito, 500 F.2d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 1974) (recovery for margin
violations denied where plaintiff, a lawyer and long-time investor, knew or should have known of
violations), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,760, at 96,500-01 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974) (plaintiff
denied recovery on margin violation claim where husband/agent was Harvard Business School graduate and professional speculator); see also Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 527 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d
Cir. 1975) (reversing award of prejudgment interest against broker who had violated Regulation T;
violation not in nature of fraud, given that plaintiff was experienced and sophisticated investor and
was not inveigled into purchase or retention of his securities); Comment, SECRule lOb-16: Should
the FederalCourtsAllow SophisticatedInvestors to Recover?, 18 PAC. L.J. 171 (1986) (analyzing split
among courts over whether there exists a private right of action for violations of Rule lOb-16, which
requires securities dealers to disclose credit terms in margin agreements; arguing that such a right of
action should exist, except in favor of sophisticated investors).
157. Dennis, Risk Arbitrageurs and the Market for Corporate Control (Book Review), 37 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 423-24 (1985) (reviewing I. BOESKY, MERGER MANIA-ARBITRAGE: WALL
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lack a justification for treating sophisticated and unsophisticated inves-

tors differently.
2. SuitabilityActions and the SophisticatedInvestor. Courts have
said that investment brokers are fiduciaries of their customers.158 As Justice Frankfurter has pointed out, however, such a statement only begins

the inquiry: the real question concerns the nature of that fiduciary relationship.1 5 9 In cases involving sophisticated customers, courts are more

likely to hold that no fiduciary relationship exists at alil 6° or that a bro16
ker's fiduciary duty is easily met. '
Under the so-called "suitability" rules of various securities exchanges, a broker has a duty to ensure a transaction's suitability for a
customer in view of that customer's risk-bearing ability and investment
objectives.' 62 When an investment goes awry, a customer may seek to
recover his losses from his broker by asserting that he breached his fiduciary duty by recommending and executing an "unsuitable" investment.1 63 A sophisticated customer, however, will likely lose such a

suitability action. In Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
STREET'S BEST KEPT MONEY MAKING SECRET (1985)). This view ignores the primary reason for
margin requirements: the systemic danger and volatility of highly leveraged markets. See supra note
154 and accompanying text. The commentator mistakenly assumes that margin requirements exist
solely to protect investors.
158. See, eg., Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2846 (1988); Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 920 (11th

Cir. 1987).
159. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
160. See, eg., Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1308 (W.D. Mich. 1986) ("Upon
the evidence presented, I have serious doubt that a fiduciary duty was owed by Hutton to plaintiff.
Plaintiff was.., an intelligent, inquisitive, and self-reliant man, inherently disinclined to relinquish
his trust to anyone."), aff'd, 829 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1227 (1988).
161. See, eg., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D.
Mich, 1978) (if customer comprehends nature of market or personally knows about a security, broker's explanation of risks involved in transaction "may be merely perfunctory"); see also Platsis, 642
F. Supp. at 1308:
The manner in which the broker is to perform these duties will depend to some degree
upon the intelligence and personality of his customer. If the customer is uneducated or

generally unsophisticated with regard to financial matters or incapable of understanding
the transaction, the broker must define the particulars of the transaction more carefully
and cautiously. However, if the customer fully understands the dynamics of the market or
is personally familiar with the security or insists on making his own decisions . . . the
broker's explanation of the risks may be merely perfunctory.
162. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, 2 NYSE Guide (CCH) %2405, at 3697, 3701
(1984); NASD Rules of Fair Practice art. III, § 2, NASD Manual (CCH) T 2152, at 2051 (1988).
See generally Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DuKE L.J. 445 (discussing suitability rules generally).
163. The customer might sue under a private right of action for violation of the suitability rule
itself, although most courts do not recognize such a private right of action. See, eg., Thompson v.
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 709 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir. 1983); Jablon v. Dean Witter &
Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679-81 (9th Cir. 1980).
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for example, the court held that a broker cannot be held liable to a highly
sophisticated plaintiff for making an unsuitable investment. 16 Nor could
a plaintiff recover for a broker's alleged failure to disclose risks when the
plaintiff had signed a margin agreement that itself provided full
1 65
disclosure.
Although the cases suggest that brokers will generally win suitability actions brought by sophisticated customers,t 66 courts in suitability
cases apparently see no relationship between these cases and other types
of cases involving sophisticated investors, despite the common characteristics of the plaintiffs involved. Nor do these suitability cases articulate
any coherent theory to justify such different treatment of sophisticated
and unsophisticated customers.
E. Enforcement of Arbitration and Forum Selection ClausesAgainst
SophisticatedInvestors.
The enforcement of arbitration clauses in securities transactions has
repeatedly attracted the Supreme Court's attention. 167 The Court's interest traces back to 1953, when it held in Wilko v. Swan that a customer's
agreement to arbitrate claims under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act was
unenforceable under section 14 of the same act.1 6 8 Then, in a 1974 case,
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court decided that the so-called" Wilko
doctrine" did not apply to arbitration agreements in international disputes under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 169 Eleven years later, in Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, the Court rejected a rule that allowed litigation of clearly arbitrable claims in federal court if such claims were
factually intertwined with claims subject to the Wilko doctrine.170 Two
years ago, in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon,1 7 1 the Court
limited the Wilko doctrine still further by holding that Wilko does not
164. 632 F. Supp. 471, 481-83 (D. Me. 1986). The court noted numerous indicia of the plaintiff's sophistication, but did not meaningfully discuss the relevance of these data to the case.
165. Id. at 482.
166. See cases cited supra notes 158-65.
167. See, e.g., Fletcher, Learning to Live With the FederalArbitrationAct-Securities Litigation
in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99 (1988) [hereinafter FederalArbitrationAct]; Fletcher,
PrivatizingSecurities Disputes Through the Enforcement of ArbitrationAgreements, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 393, 404-20 (1987) [hereinafter PrivatizingDisputes]; Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrabilityof
Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50
ALB. L. REv. 725 (1986); Note, The Arbitrabilityof Claims Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 12 J.
CORP. L. 535 (1987); Note, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon: What's Left for the
Courts in Securities Litigation?, 62 TULANE L. REv. 284 (1987); Note, The Arbitrability of Federal
Securities Claims: Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203 (1987).
168. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
169. 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
170. 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985).
171. 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
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apply to agreements to arbitrate claims under the 1934 Act 172 or the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 173 This Term
the Court will decide whether to overrule Wilko. 174
Wilko, Scherk, Byrd, and McMahon have, however, left undecided
the question of immediate importance here: should the Wilko doctrine
apply to sophisticated investors' agreements to arbitrate? 175 Some courts
say "no," thus adopting a sophisticated-investor exception to the doc177
trine176-a position that the weight of scholarly commentary favors.
Other courts seem sympathetic to such an exception but have not explic-

itly adopted it,178 and a large number of courts have referred to the exception in holding sophisticated investors to forum selection
agreements. 179 Other courts, however, have explicitly rejected the idea of
172. Id. at 2337-41.
173. Id. at 2345-46. These three cases-Scherk Byrd, and McMahon-have thus gradually

eroded the Wilko doctrine and given effect to the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-14 (1982), that arbitration agreements can be enforced. See FederalArbitrationAct, supra note
167; Privatizing Disputes, supra note 167, at 404-20.
174. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 389 (1988) (No. 88-385).
175. The Court in Scherk mentioned but did not reach the issue, since it decided the case on
other grounds. See Scherk 417 U.S. at 512 n.6. Justice Douglas's dissent argued for rejection of the
sophisticated investor exception to the Wilko doctrine. See id at 526 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
176. See, eg., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 634 n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to
apply Wilko doctrine to sophisticated businessmen); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp.
14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (suggesting sophisticated investor exception to Wilko doctrine); GCA Corp.
v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,339, at 91,815 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
13, 1972) (same); see also Katsoris, The Arbitration of a PublicSecurities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L.
REv. 279, 295 (1984) ("Courts generally will not apply the Wilko restraint, however, when it is clear
that the parties are knowledgeable persons-for example, a sophisticated investor and a brokerdealer-and that the arbitration agreement was the result of an arm's length transaction."); Peloso,
Agreements to Arbitrate, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 943, 946-47 (1980) (same).

177. See, eg., 2 FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 1725(b)(3)(C) (1980) (recommending rule that would
codify Wilko doctrine but provide for exception in cases involving sophisticated investors); Privatizing Disputes, supra note 167, at 427-31.
178. See, eg., Goldberg v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette See. Corp., 650 F. Supp. 222, 226
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that, pursuant to their agreement, exchange members must arbitrate not
only disputes arising out of professional activities but all others as well, since exchange members are
"sophisticated investors, not inexperienced investors"); McMahon v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Arbitration clauses are routinely upheld by the
courts, and, given plaintiffs' sizeable investment, there is nothing to indicate that they were without
bargaining power."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1359 (D. Nev. 1980) (finding "patently frivolous" a claim by sophisticated investor that arbitration
agreement procured by fraud); see also Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,
558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Wilko doctrine because plaintiff was small individual
investor, unlike the one in Scherk, and noting influence of plaintiff's sophistication in both Wilko
and Scherk).
179. See, eg., Luce v. Idelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Plaintiffs, sophisticated investors who warranted their familiarity with the agreement, have failed to offer any reason for us not to
enforce the forum-selection clause in this case."); Friedman v. World Trans. Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685,
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such an exception to the Wilko doctrine.180

I have argued elsewhere in favor of this exception and have attempted to draw up guidelines for its practical application. 18 ' The point
here, in contrast, is that some courts have distinguished between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors in applying the Wilko doctrine, while
others have explicitly avoided doing so. Yet again, a set of unifying principles would clarify the situation.
F. SophisticatedInvestors in Class Actions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) lists the prerequisites to class
certification:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder

of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
representative
82
the class.1

Having a sophisticated investor as a class representative raises an issue
under the Rule's third requirement, typicality. Courts have not agreed
whether sophistication makes a representative more typical, less typical,
or has no bearing on the question of typicality.

The typicality requirement protects a litigant class as a whole by
ensuring that the class's representative is neither distracted by legal and

factual issues not common to the class nor uniquely vulnerable to defenses that do not apply to other class members.' 8 3 Class certification
690 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (rejecting argument by plaintiff, "plainly a wealthy and sophisticated investor,"
that forum selection clause resulted from overwhelming bargaining power); Adelson v. World Trans.
Inc., 631 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (rejecting sophisticated businessmen's argument that
forum selection agreement not enforceable).
180. See, eg., Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
As the Newman court stated, "[t]he federal securities laws do not distinguish between sophisticated
and unsophisticated investors, and the protection afforded by their antifraud and registration provisions are designed for all investors, whether sophisticated or unsophisticated." Both points, however, can be disputed. First, the securities laws do explicitly distinguish between sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors under certain circumstances. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982) (registration exemption only for those securities sold to accredited investors). Second, Congress designed the
securities laws primarily to protect investors incapable of protecting themselves. See Weissbuch, 558
F.2d at 834 (securities acts passed to protect small investors); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F.
Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (primary purpose of securities laws is to protect those investors
unable to protect themselves); Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in Investor-Broker
Agreements, ARB. J., Mar. 1979, at 5, 9; see also infra notes 315-29 and accompanying text (discussing policies behind securities laws).
181. See PrivatizingDisputes, supra note 167, at 427, 429-3 1.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
183. Fisher v. Plessey Co., 103 F.R.D. 150, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); McNichols v. Loeb Rhoades &
Co., 97 F.R.D. 331, 334-35 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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will not be refused merely because the proposed class representative
stands in a different factual position from other segments of the class.
For a class representative to fail the typicality test, the difference of posi1 84
tion must significantly jeopardize the interests of the class as a whole.
Sophistication becomes an issue because of courts' approach to the
typicality requirement, which focuses on the plaintiff and holds it "wellsettled ... that where the representative party is subject to unique defenses his claim is not typical of the class." 1 85 Under this approach, to
negate typicality and prevent class certification, the defendant need only
point out some defense that is "unique, arguable and likely to usurp a
significant portion of the litigant's time and energy." 1 86 All questions of
class certification involve trial courts' discretion, and appellate courts
will not reverse such decisions on appeal unless these decisions reflect
abuses of discretion.1 87 Using this discretion, trial courts have reached
wildly disparate results in the treatment of sophisticated investors.
Many courts refuse to permit soplisticated plaintiffs to represent a
class because defendants can raise certain unique defenses against
them. 188 The Fifth Circuit, for example, has repeatedly held that a representative's sophistication destroys typicality in a Rule lOb-5 class action
because the representative has a weaker due diligence case than does the
rest of the class.1 8 9 Other courts reach the same result under the heading
of justifiable reliance.1 90 Thus, in Model Associates v. United States Steel
Corp., 191 the court held that the plaintiff, a corporate in-and-out trader
controlled by sophisticated individuals, could not represent a class. The
184. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 97 F.R.D. 657, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
185. McNichols, 97 F.R.D. at 334.

186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 574 F.2d 1220, 1221 (5th Cir. 1978)
(trial court did not abuse discretion in denying class certification for lack of typicality where plaintiff
was sophisticated investor), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
188. See, e.g., Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322, 324-25 (D. Colo. 1984); Helfand v. Cenco,
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 1, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
189. See Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 1984); Garonzik, 574 F.2d at
1221. As one commentator has pointed out, the typicality problem results from the individualized
due diligence standard generally applied in Rule lOb-5 cases. See Marcus, supra note 53, at 881.
But see Dekro v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406, 416 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (since it is "abundantly
clear" that due diligence requirement applies class-wide rather than on an individual basis, it is not
necessary to evaluate each class member's individual mental state) (citing In re Commonwealth Oil/
Tesoro Petroleum Sec. Litig., 484 F. Supp. 253, 258 (W.D. Tex. 1979)).
190. See, e.g., Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931-32 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Model Asocs. v.
United States Steel Corp., 88 F.R.D. 338, 340-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see also In re Consumers Power
Co. See. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 609 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (refusing to certify class on state fraud claims
because "less sophisticated investors may be entitled to rely on statements that would not fool more
sophisticated investors"); Weintraub v. Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(sophisticated investor status may give rise to unique defenses).
191. 88 F.R.D. at 338.
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court reasoned that such a sophisticated plaintiff was less likely to have
relied on any alleged misrepresentations than were unsophisticated mem192
bers of the class.
In contrast, some courts have concluded that investor sophistication
does not affect typicality and is no bar to class representation. 193 Courts
so conclude because they find that defendants cannot actually assert the
defenses in question against the representative, 194 or because those de195
fenses turn out not to be unique.
Still other courts acknowledge that sophisticated representatives
may indeed face unique defenses, but find that such defenses do not obstruct the representation. 196 Thus, in O'Connor & Associates v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 197 the defendants sought to prevent a plaintiff's
appointment as class representative by claiming that his sophistication
would raise a unique defense: as a sophisticated investor, the plaintiff
should have known that increased volume indicated insider trading. The
court rejected the argument, reasoning that even if the defense were
valid, it was still unlikely to "become the focus of the litigation and...
192. Id. at 340-41; see also Carr v. New York Stock Exch., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1305 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (class action not a superior form of litigation where all class members are sophisticated investors who can bring individual claims).
193. See, ag., Darvin v. International Harvester Co., 610 F. Supp. 255, 258 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,931, at 94,549 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1986) (sophistication does not "render these plaintiffs' claims atypical"); Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1983) ("furthermore, the plaintiff's general legal background enhances, rather than detracts, from his adequacy as a
class representative in this complicated action"); In re LTV See. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 149-50 (N.D.
Tex. 1980) (would-be class representative not disqualified because of active stock trading); Feder v.
Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (difference in class representative's degree of reliance and quantum of damages does not bar typicality).
194. See, eg., Westlake, 565 F. Supp. at 1334 (rejecting defendants' suggestion that court examine representative's individual claims of reliance); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 94 F.R.D. 570,
575-76 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (after Affiliated Ute, plaintiffs in Rule lOb-5 omissions cases need not prove
individual reliance; thus, no reliance defense assertable against sophisticated plaintiff); Dekro v.
Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406, 416 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (since clear that due diligence applies
class-wide, individual mental state of each class member is irrelevant).
195. See, e.g., Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 100 F.R.D. 781, 789 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (no unique
defense against sophisticated investor, because any misrepresentations or omissions would have been
made to or withheld from both sophisticated and unsophisticated members of class). See generally
Note, Class Actions, Typicality, and Rule lOb-S: Will the Typical Representative Please Stand Up?,
36 EMORY L.J. 649, 676-83 (1987) (discussing typicality requirement and recommending that sophistication not count against adequacy as class representative).
196. See, eg., A & J Deutscher Family Fund v. Bullard, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,938, at 94,584 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1986) (fact that sophistication of named class
representative subjected him to materiality defense did not impede representation); Fisher v. Plessey
Co., 103 F.R.D. 150, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (named class representative, who was subject to unique
"sophisticated investor" defense, still suitable class representative).
197. 559 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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divert attention from the substance of the basic claim."1,9
Some cases have proposed other possible solutions to this unique
defenses problem. In both Ridings v. Canadian ImperialBank of Commerce Trust Co. (Bahamas)199 and McFarlandv. Memorex Corp.,2°° the
courts suggested that the availability of defenses against sophisticated
class members should not bar class certification, since courts could conduct individualized hearings on those unique defenses. Similarly, in
Greenwald v. IntegratedEnergy, Inc., the court held that the possibility
of defenses unique to a sophisticated representative should not bar his
appointment; the class could replace him if such defenses actually
20 1
arose.
In considering the effect of a representative's sophistication on class
certification, courts have also focused on Rule 23(a)'s fourth requirement, adequacy. 20 2 For example, in Peil v. Speiser, the court decided
that the plaintiff's sophistication made him a more adequate representative than he would otherwise be; presumably his financial knowledge
would improve his ability to pursue the class's interests.20 3 Moreover,
although the judiciary has since repudiated the argument, defendants
once commonly argued that unsophisticated plaintiffs make poor class
2 o4
representatives.
As though not enough confusion and contention already surrounded
the treatment of sophisticated investors in class actions, the emergence of
the fraud on the market theory in Rule lOb-5 cases has added an additional point of dispute. The fraud on the market theory allows a plaintiff
to allege a more attenuated version of reliance: instead of alleging direct
reliance on a defendant's misrepresentations, the plaintiff claims that he
relied on the general integrity of the market in pricing and deciding
whether to buy or sell the security at issue, and that the defendant's mis198. O'Connor, 559 F. Supp. at 806 n.7 (citing Kline v. Wolf, 88 F.R.D. 696, 700 (S.D.N.Y.
1981)). Another interesting issue in O'Connor concerns the defendants' standing, as options traders,
to assert insider trading violations. See O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1179, 1186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding, on motion to dismiss, that O'Connor had standing
on misappropriation theory); see also Note, PrivateCauses ofAction for Option Investors Under SEC
Rule 10b-5: A Policy,Doctrinal,and Economic Analysis, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1959 (1987) (arguing in
favor of standing, but noting split among courts).
199. 94 F.R.D. 147, 151-52 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
200. 96 F.R.D. 357, 363 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
201. 102 F.R.D. 65, 70 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see supra text accompanying note 182 (quoting the Rule).
203, 97 F.R.D. 657, 661 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1344
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff's legal background enhances his adequacy as class representative); Ridings, 94 F.R.D. at 152 (sophisticated investors no less able to represent class and perhaps more able).

204. See Fickinger v. C.I. Planning Corp., 103 F.R.D. 529, 533 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[A]ny
suggestion that a would-be class representative need be a sophisticated investor versed in securities

law has been rejected by the Supreme Court.").

Vol. 1988:1081]

SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS

1115

representations resulted in a distorted market price. 20 5 Thus, the plaintiff
claims, as a result of the defendant's misrepresentation, he bought or sold
20 6
the security at a falsely inflated or deflated price.
This theory minimizes some of the problems that a sophisticated
class representative faces. By obviating a plaintiff's need to prove reliance on a defendant's misrepresentations, 20 7 the theory eliminates some
of the most important unique defenses that defendants can assert against
sophisticated plaintiffs. For this reason, most courts faced with the issue
have (quite properly) decided that investor sophistication does not affect
typicality in fraud on the market cases. As the court in Leist v. Tamco
Enterprises stated:
Plaintiff, as a professional investor, the class members as amateurs, and
indeed, those who choose stock by means of a ouija board or by throwing darts at the list, all believe as an article of faith that the market is
an honest market.... Where the public market of a quoted security is
polluted by false information, or where price, supply and demand are
distorted as a result of misleading omissions, all types of investors
are
20 8
injured, experienced and inexperienced, smart and stupid.
Courts are not unanimous on this point, however. For example, in
Zandman v. Joseph,209 a fraud on the market case, the court found the
plaintiff's sophistication relevant to his adequacy as a class representative. According to the court, notwithstanding the presence of a fraud on
the market theory, the sophisticated plaintiff would still have a more
difficult time showing justifiable reliance than would other class members. 2 10 The plaintiff arguably had not relied on the market, and would
205. The efficient-market hypothesis, some form of which is necessary to sustain the fraud on the
market theory, is not universally accepted. Compare Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers-Does Anything Go?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 103, 103-09 (1986) (relying upon efficient-market hy-

pothesis and citing to commentary and theoretical work on the hypothesis) with Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 825-30 (questioning efficient-market hypothesis). See also Donnelly,
supra note 24 (reporting debate among academics over efficient-market hypothesis' viability).
206. For good general discussions of the fraud on the market theory, see Stoller v. BaldwinUnited Corp., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,298, at 92,024-25 (S.D.
Ohio June 4, 1985); Note, supra note 24. A plurality of the Supreme Court has accepted the theory.
See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 988-92 (1988) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall
& Stevens, JJ.).
207. See, eg., HSL, Inc. v. Daniels, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 1
99,557, at 97,197-99 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 1983) (fraud on market theory creates rebuttable presumption of reliance on defendant's misrepresentations).
208. Leist v. Tamco Enters., 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1424, 1427 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see
also Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976) ("Differences in sophistication, etc., among purchasers have no bearing in the impersonal market fraud
context, because dissemination of false information necessarily translates through market mechanisms into price inflation which harms each purchaser identically.").
209. 102 F.R.D. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
210. Id. at 931-32. The plaintiff, however, relied not on the market, but on personal conversations with company officials.
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therefore be subject to a defense not applicable to the rest of the class.
In this context as well, courts exhibit no unifying, or even coherent,
theory for treating sophisticated investors. Part II of this Article will
attempt to resolve this confusion.
G. Statutes of Limitations and the SophisticatedInvestor.
Courts applying statutes of limitations to sophisticated investors
show little more agreement than courts dealing with sophisticated investors in class actions. Many of the problems that arise with respect to
statutes of limitations in Rule lOb-5 cases resemble those encountered
with the Rule's due diligence requirement. 2 11 Many statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff actually discovers the wrongdoing at
issue, or would have discovered it by exercising due diligence. 2 12 In
other words, a statute of limitations creates a window of time in which a
plaintiff must file an action, but will permit the plaintiff to toll that period
if he would not have discovered the alleged wrongdoing even by exercising reasonable diligence. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]his equitable doctrine [of tolling] is read into every federal statute of
2 13
limitation[s]."
When a sophisticated investor seeks to toll a statute of limitations,
the question arises whether a different standard of due diligence should
apply. Although a majority of courts agree that sophistication is relevant
to the tolling issue,2 14 the caselaw reflects confusion. While some courts
seem willing to treat sophisticated and unsophisticated investors differently, others refuse to do so. The various judicial approaches fall into
roughly four categories.
The first category consists of cases that hold sophisticated plaintiffs
to a higher due diligence standard. Under this higher standard, courts
decline to excuse a sophisticated plaintiff's nondiscovery of a wrong or to
211. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
212. Decisions in fraud cases involving statutes of limitations have long required that plaintiffs
exercise reasonable diligence to discover the fraud at issue. See, eg., Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d
818, 821 (3d Cir. 1941). The 1933 Act contains its own statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(m)

(1982). The statutes of limitations for express rights of action under the 1934 Act are contained in
id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b). The limitations period for implied rights of action under the 1934
Act-including Rule 10b-5 actions-is the limitations period that the forum state applies in similar
actions. Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1979); Klein v. Bower, 421
F.2d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1970).

213. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
214. See, e.g., Bengiovi v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 92,012, at 91,015 n.6 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1985) (sophistication labeled a "significant
factor"); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979)
(giving legal sophistication weight in assessment of due diligence), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.

1981).
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toll the limitations period, thus generally upholding statute-of-limitations
defenses to sophisticated plaintiffs' claims. 2 15 As the Eighth Circuit
stated in Buder v. MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc., a sophisticated plaintiff "may not deliberately close his eyes to the information
available to him which would demonstrate to any reasonable person...
that the alleged representations of [defendant] as to the soundness and
lack of risk... could not have been true." 2 16 Similarly, in Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail,Barber & Ross, 2 17 the court refused to toll the statute of
limitations when the plaintiff was the State of Ohio:
In assessing the meaning of due diligence, this court gives some weight
to the amount in controversy and the legal sophistication of the party
involved. In this case, the state of Ohio is much more than a casual
dabbler in the securities market. The size of the claim alone implies
that a degree of care and diligence should be employed in its
2 18
pursuit.
In the second type of case, courts apply the same standard of due
diligence to sophisticated investors as to ordinary investors and, as a result, generally toll the statute at issue: For example, in In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Securities Litigation,2 19 the court
articulated an "objective" standard of due diligence, which asks
"whether the facts available would have put a reasonably prudent investor on 'inquiry notice' of the possibility that the registration statement
contained misstatements or omissions. ' 220 Under that standard, the
court found the plaintiff's sophistication irrelevant to whether the limitations period had run, since the court focused not on what the plaintiff
himself knew, but on what a reasonable investor would have known. 221
Such a reading of the 1933 Act's statute of limitations seems to clash
with the language of that section, 222 as well as the majority of cases. 223
215. See, e.g., Bender v. Rocky Mountain Drilling Assocs., 648 F. Supp. 330, 334-35 (D.D.C.
1986); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 56, 58-59 (E.D. Mo.
1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 644 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1981); Gammage v.
Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %94,759, at 96,498-500
(S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974); Maine v. Leonard, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,407, at 95,412-15 (W.D. Va. Oct. 17, 1973).
Since a plaintiff's sophistication is a question of fact, outright dismissal or summary judgment
would be inappropriate if sophistication is contested in a given case. See, ag., Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172-73 (10th Cir. 1974); Bengiovi, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,015-16.
216. 644 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting trial court).
217. 472 F. Supp. 402 (D. Colo. 1979).
218. Id. at 408.
219. 484 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
220. Id. at 257.
221. Id. at 258.
222. The statute calls for an inquiry into what each particularplaintiff,if careful, should reasonably have discovered. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982) ("No action shall be maintained to enforce any liabil-
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Courts in the third type of case more readily permit unsophisticated

investors to toll statutes of limitations than they permit all other investors to do so. As the court in Boyd v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith pointed out, "an unsophisticated investor who considers her broker to be a fiduciary should not be expected to make as diligent or comprehensive an inquiry as a sophisticated investor who is the victim of a
flagrant and widely publicized fraud.

Shwartz, 225

' 224

Similarly, in Weiser v.

a relatively unsophisticated investor brought a churning

claim, but filed it after the statutory time period had elasped. Because

the plaintiff lacked financial sophistication, the court tolled the statute.226
In deciding whether the plaintiff had constructive notice, the court asked
whether an exercise of reasonable diligence would have notified the

plaintiff of the churning, and that inquiry required the court to examine
his sophistication. Given the plaintiff's relative lack of sophistication,
the court held that despite his receipt of confirmation slips and monthly
statements, the plaintiff had no notice.227

In the fourth type of case, courts refuse to allow even unusually
unsophisticatedinvestors a longer limitations period than ordinary inves-

tors. These cases hold that unless a defendant affirmatively conceals alleged misconduct from a plaintiff, the statute of limitations will not
toll. 228 These cases sometimes produce harsh results. 229 In Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 230 for example, an elderly widow in a nursing home

and her daughter, neither of whom had any financial experience, sued
their broker for numerous alleged violations. The court held that their
ity created under section 77k or section 771(2) ... unless brought within one year after the discovery
of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence .... ").
223. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
224. 611 F. Supp. 218, 220 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (citing Azalea Meats v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 9 (5th
Cir. 1967)).
225. 286 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968). Although the plaintiff was an insurance company executive, the court found him unsophisticated because he had only recently learned what churning was,
and his investments had performed poorly.
226. Id. at 393.
227. Id.
228. See, eg., Koke v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 620 F.2d 1340, 1343 (8th Cir. 1980) (statute of
limitations begins to run from the date when fraud, upon reasonable inquiry, should have been
discovered); Militsky v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 783, 787-88
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (statute began to run on date when reasonable person should have discovered
alleged fraud); see also Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 600, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (even singer Bessie
Smith's lack of sophistication cannot toll statute of limitations for 40 years), aff'd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d
Cir. 1979).
229. In Militsky, the court noted the rule's harshness when applied to a naive, unsophisticated
investor, but nonetheless held that it could not toll the statute without evidence of affirmative concealment. See Militsky, 540 F. Supp. at 787-88.
230. 620 F.2d at 1340.
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claims were time-barred, refusing to toll the statute of limitations
notwithstanding the plaintiffs' lack of sophistication: the broker had attempted no concealment, and the plaintiffs had received accurate
23 1
monthly statements.
Decisions that refuse to recognize an unsophisticatedinvestor's special status are as much at odds with the purpose of the tolling doctrine as
cases that refuse to recognize the relevance of a sophisticated investor's
status. 232 The tolling doctrine calls upon a court to determine what a
plaintiff would have known had she exercised due diligence;2 33 in this
area, as in others involving questions of due diligence,2 34 most courts
adopt a common-sense approach. They recognize that an unsophisticated elderly widow will not exercise the same degree of diligence that a
235
sophisticated, professionally managed investment fund will apply.
In short, courts disagree widely about the relevance of sophistication, or unsophistication, in statute-of-limitations cases. And again, the
confusion stems from a complete lack of unifying principles for the judicial treatment of sophisticated investors.
H. Registration Exemptions Under the 1933 Act and the
Sophisticated Investor.
The wide variety in investors' understanding and competence has
led to a certain schizophrenia in disclosure philosophy. At whom should
registration statements, prospectuses, and other disclosure requirements
be aimed? Who should benefit from federally mandated disclosure? The
SEC has long taken the position that registration statements should be
simple enough for an average investor to understand, yet detailed enough
to provide a sophisticated analyst with real information. 236 Others have
recognized that unsophisticated investors do not generally read registration statements or prospectuses and have suggested that aiming registra231. Id. at 1343.
232. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text (discussing due diligence requirement in connection with Rule lOb-5 claims).
235. One commentator has labeled this line of cases "unjust," while nonetheless considering it
"ill-advised" to relax statutes of limitations except when a defendant has schemed to take advantage

of a plaintiff's incapacity. See Marcus, supra note 53, at 879. Curiously, however, Marcus argues in
favor of an individualized test for due diligence if an investor is more sophisticated than average. Id.
at 880. Such a double standard seems unwarranted.
236. See, eg., In re Universal Camera Corp., 19 S.E.C. 648, 654 (1945); Panel Discussion, New
Approaches to Disclosurein RegisteredSecurity Offerings, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 527 (1973) (remarks of
Harold Marsh) (prospectus must be addressed to both unsophisticated and knowledgeable investors). Courts, too, have suggested that registration statements and prospectuses should contain

enough information for even the most sophisticated investor and still not slight the unsophisticated.
See, eg., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

1120

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1988:1081

tion statements at sophisticated investors will also protect the
unsophisticated by ensuring that market prices reflect any adverse disclosures. 237 Still others have suggested that a registration statement should
be directed only to those capable of understanding the transactions
238
described.
Congress and the SEC have responded to this confusion by exempting securities offered to wealthy or astute investors from the 1933 Act's
registration requirements. 2 39 These criteria of sophistication play a central role in three groups of exemptions, 24° which the following subsections will discuss in turn.
1. Private Offerings Under Section 4(2) and Rule 506. Section
4(2) of the 1933 Act, itself a very short provision that makes no reference
to investor sophistication, grants a registration exemption to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering. '24 1 As a substantial
judicial gloss on the section clarifies, an offeree's sophistication plays an
important role in determining whether a transaction involves a public
offering.
In a 1953 case, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 242 the Supreme Court
established ground rules for applying section 4(2). In rejecting Ralston
Purina's assertion that an employee stock sale plan was not a public offering, the Court emphasized that the public offering issue "should turn
on whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of
the [1933] Act."'243 The Court also highlighted the primary importance
of two criteria: sophistication and access.
An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is
a transaction "not involving any public offering."

237. See, eg., Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1351-52 (1966);

Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 636-37 (1973); see also SEC, DIsCLOSURE TO INVESTORs: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINIsTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE

1933 AND 1934 ACT 53 (1969) [hereinafter DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS] (known as the "Wheat
Report") (citing Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE L.J. 508, 523-24 (1933) (although only
sophisticated investors can understand disclosure materials, market price will reflect the materials'
content, thereby protecting unsophisticated investors as well)); Feit, 332 F. Supp. at 565-66 (same).
238. See Panel Discussion, supra note 236, at 527.
239. As discussed infra notes 268-76 and accompanying text, these exemptions aim at securities

offered to either "accredited" or "sophisticated" investors. The two categories describe different
types of investors: the former may be wealthy, yet wholly unsophisticated, whereas the latter may be
financially astute, yet unable to bear the burden of the risks they assume.
240. As pointed out infra note 277 and accompanying text, purchaser or offeree sophistication
affects other exemptions at both the state and federal level.
241. 15 US.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
242. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
243. Id. at 125.
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The focus of the inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the

protections afforded by registration. The employees here were not
shown to have access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose. 244

Courts applying the Ralston Purina standard have continued to emphasize the importance of offerees' sophistication. 245 Some courts have
repeatedly suggested that sophisticated offerees do not need the registration provision's protection. 246 Other courts explicitly require offeree sophistication before granting exemptions. 247 In fac.t, many courts have
conditioned the exemption's availability on the involvement of sophisticated offerees. 248 Under that approach, if any of the offerees are unsophisticated, the offering is a public one and the section 4(2) exemption
becomes unavailable. 24 9
244. Id. at 125, 127.
245. In Ralston Purina, the Court attempted to determine who needed the 1933 Act's protection
and decided that if an investor had both access to information and the ability to fend for himself, the
protections afforded by registration were unnecessary. See Note, Revising the Private Placement
Exemption, 82 YALE L.J. 1512, 1514 (1973). As subsequent cases clarify, the ability to fend for
oneself depends not on wealth, but on one's ability to evaluate information from an issuer. See, eg.,
Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 191,523, at
94,970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965) (sophisticated offerees, as experienced institutional investors, had
access to information that registration statement would have disclosed and were therefore able to
fend for themselves).
One commentator, however, has argued that sophistication should be irrelevant in this area.
See Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REV. SEc. REG. 869, 874-76 (1981).
246. See, e.g., Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963); Woodward v. Wright, 266
F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959); Collier v.
Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958).
247. See Section 4(2) andStatutory Law_-A PositionPaperof the FederalRegulation ofSecurities
Committee, 31 Bus. LAW. 485, 489-95 (1975) [hereinafter Position Paper] (discussing four criteria,
including "offeree qualification"); Soraghan, supra note 134, at 10-11, 20-27 (discussing three criteria, including "investment sophistication"). The Ninth Circuit has established a four-part test for
applying the exemption, which includes:
(1) the number of offerees;
(2) the sophistication of the offerees;
(3) the size and manner of the offering; and
(4) the relationship of the offerees to the issuer.
See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644-47 (9th Cir. 1980); McDaniel v. Compania Minera Mar de
Cortes, 528 F. Supp. 152, 162 (D. Ariz. 1981); see also Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,438, at 99,210-11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1976) (listing
requirements for exemption, including access to information and offeree sophistication).
248. See, eg., Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971) (exemption applies only
to offerees "of exceptional business experience"); SEC v. International Scanning Devices, Inc.,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,147, at 92,170 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1977)
(exemption available to offerees who do not need protection of 1933 Act registration provisions and
who are knowledgeable concerning issuer's affairs).
249. See, eg., SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 95,229, at 98,210-12 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1975) (defendant failed to show that all
purchasers of stock were sophisticated enough to protect their own interests; therefore, section 4(2)
exemption did not apply), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
This result occurs even if a plaintiff is himself sophisticated: he may assert that an offering is not
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Although a plaintiff's sophistication often leads a court to rule for a
defendant in section 4(2) cases,2 50 sophistication remains a necessary, but
not a sufficient, condition for the exemption. As the Fifth Circuit remarked in Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., "evidence of a high
degree of business or legal sophistication on the part of all offerees does
not suffice to bring the offering within the private placement exemption."'25 ' Sophistication alone provides a poor substitute for the sort of
information that registration discloses; as the Doran court realized, without access to information, the sophisticated investor cannot bring her
sophistication to bear.25 2 Indeed, courts have held that, without access
to information, even sophistication of all the offerees in an offering will
not satisfy the exemption's requirements. 25 3 In Andrews v. Blue, 2 54 the
Tenth Circuit reinforced that point: "The statute is intended to promote
full disclosure to every investor regardless of his particular business background. Ralston Purina rejects the idea that an exemption exists based
only on the individual sophistication of the offeree and without regard to
his actual knowledge concerning the issuer. 2 55
In its current safe-harbor rules for the section 4(2) exemption, the
SEC has incorporated the idea that offeree sophistication is necessary but
not sufficient.25 6 The SEC's older version of these rules, Rule 146, imposed three requirements before an issuer could reach the safe harbor:
First, an issuer needed reasonable grounds to believe that each offeree
was a sophisticated investor. Either wealth or knowledge could demonstrate that sophistication.2 5 7 Second, before consummating a sale, an issuer had to have reasonable grounds to believe that a purchaser either
exempt because other offerees are unsophisticated. See, e.g., McDaniel, 528 F. Supp. at 164 (plaintiff's familiarity with industry not a bar to recovery if defendant fals to show that all offerees had

adequate information).
250. See, e.g., Barrett, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 99,211 (offerees

sophisticated, but exemption granted); Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(implying that section 4(2) exemption would be available on showing of access and sophistication),
aff'd sub nom. Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Bowers v. Columbia Gen.
Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 622-24 (D. Del. 1971) (finding preliminary injunction inappropriate, since
plaintiff's sophistication made success on merits of section 4(2) claim unlikely).
251. 545 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises,
448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971)).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1289-90 (4th Cir. 1978); Mason v. Marshall,
412 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Henderson v.
Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1070 (5th Cir. 1972) (even though plaintiff was sophisticated

investor, defendant could not claim section 4(2) exemption, since it failed to establish other elements
of exemption).
254. 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973).

255. Id. at 373-74 (citation and footnote omitted).
256. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988).
257. Id. § 230.146(d)(1) (1976), repealed and replaced by 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1988).

Vol. 1988:1081]

SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS

1123

could evaluate the investment's risks and merits himself, or had consulted a financial advisor and was able to bear the financial risks.25 8 Finally, each offeree had to have access to the same kind of information
that a registration statement would have provided.2 59 Rule 146 thus required that all offerees be sophisticated or wealthy, but that actual purchasers be sophisticated or consult a financial advisor.
This entire scheme changed in 1982, when the SEC promulgated
Regulation D and substituted Rule 506 for Rule 146.260 The new Rule
replaces the old Rule's dual requirement of access and sophistication
with a dual requirement of access and either sophistication or wealth.
Rule 506 requires limited disclosure 61 and then permits sales to up to
thirty-five sophisticated investors who "either alone or with [their] purchaser representative(s) [have] such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the merits
and risks of the prospective investment. '2 62 The Rule also permits sales
to an unlimited number of "accredited investors, 26r3 defined to include
wealthy investors without regard to their sophistication.2 64 Neither category of sales-to accredited investors or to sophisticated investors-requires registration, presumably because neither group requires the
protections that registration affords.26 5
Rule 506 thus departs from the Ralston Purina line of cases.2 66
Whereas before, private placement purchasers had to be smart, now they
need only be rich. Such a departure raises an important, and unanswered, question: should the law presume that wealthy investors, who
can bear investment risks, are sophisticated investors, and treat them as
such, no matter how financially naive they may be? Conversely, should
the law treat poor, but financially sophisticated investors, who cannot
258. Id. § 230.146(d)(2).
259. Id. § 230.146(e).
260. See id. § 230.501-.506 (1988). Regulation D, containing the Uniform Limited Offering Exemptions, contains the .SEC's reformulation of several exemptions that had previously been treated
separately. See Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc., 749 F.2d 915, 916 n.2 (1st Cir. 1984).
261. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b); see also id. § 230.502(b)(2) (discussing type of disclosure required if
issuer not subject to reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of 1934 Act).
262. Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
263. Id. § 230.506(b)(2); see also id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding accredited investors from calculation of number of purchasers).
264. Id. § 230.501(a).
265. In fact, the SEC has recently proposed changes in Regulation D that would lower the
thresholds for the "accredited investor" test. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 323 (Mar.
4, 1988); 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 85 (Jan. 16, 1987).
266. The most persuasive reading of Ralston Purina suggests that when the Court indicated that
those who can fend for themselves do not need the 1933 Act's protections, it referred not to wealthy
investors, but to financially sophisticated individuals capable of evaluating information provided by
an issuer. See Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965); Note, supra note 245, at 1514-15.
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bear investment risks, like other sophisticated investors? In short, what
role should wealth and sophistication play in the determination whether
an issuer must undertake 1933 Act registration? Neither the courts nor
the SEC have adequately treated these questions. 267 Part II of this Article will address them.
2. Accredited Investor Exemptions Under Seciion 4(6). These
same questions arise in connection with section 4(6) of the 1933 Act,
which establishes a registration exemption for offers and sales to accredited investors. 268 Section 2(15) of that Act defines "accredited investor"
to include whomever the SEC deems accredited in light of "such factors
as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in fi'269
nancial matters, or amount of assets under management.
While section 2(15)'s language clearly reflects a congressional intent
that the SEC consider any relevant indicia of sophistication, the SEC has
made true financial sophistication irrelevant. In promulgating Rule 215
to further define the term "accredited investor" under section 2(15), the
SEC has made wealth rather than sophistication the sine qua non of accredited investor status. 270 Like Regulation D, 2 7 1 Rule 215 includes
within its definition certain institutions and persons affiliated with issuers, but it also includes individual investors whose net worth or income
272
meets certain prescribed levels.
As in the case of Rule 506, the SEC assumes either that wealthy
investors are always sophisticated or that they, no matter how naive, do
not need the protection of the 1933 Act's registration provisions. Here
too, the relationship of wealth and sophistication to the need for such
protection requires further study.
3. Small Offerings Under Section 3(b) and Rule 505. The SEC
has repeated this pattern of registration exemptions for wealthy but unso-

phisticated investors in Rule

505,273

promulgated under section 3(b) of

the 1933 Act.2 74 As a registration exemption provision, section 3(b) is an
empty vessel with a lid. It contains no exemption of its own, but authorizes the SEC to add an exemption for small issues involving sales of up
267. One student commentator has proposed a test that would combine regular dealings in financial matters and previous investment experience, as determined by portfolio size, to determine availability of the private placement exemption. See Note, supra note 245, at 1529-30 & n.93.

268. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(6) (1982).
269. Id. § 77b(15).
270. 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1988).
271. Id. § 230.501(a).
272. Id. § 230.215(e)-(g).

273. Id. § 230.505.
274. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982).
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to $5 million worth of securities if the SEC determines "that the enforcement of [the 1933 Act] with respect to such securities is not necessary in
'275
the public interest and for the protection of investors.
Rules 504 and 505 exercise the authority granted in section 3(b).
Rule 505 permits sales of securities to proceed without registration if
made to no more than thirty-five investors, not including "accredited investors" (again, defined in Rule 501(a) as wealthy but not necessarily
financially sophisticated investors); 276 it thus allows unregulated sales to
an unlimited number of "accredited investors."
Investor sophistication also affects other, less important, exemptions
from registration, 277 but the ones discussed here illustrate the fundamental policy problem that demands attention: determining the proper analysis of investor sophistication and investor wealth under the 1933 Act's
requirements. We should applaud Congress and the SEC for their efforts
to maximize efficiency in capital formation by eliminating costly registration requirements where the costs outweigh the marginal benefits of investor protection. Moreover, exempting securities offered and sold only
to people who do not need federally mandated disclosure protection is a
good idea, and might beneficially extend to other areas of securities law.
Yet, this attempt to tie registration requirements to investors' needs for
protection calls for further inquiry into what sorts of investors really
need registration protection. Courts assume without justification that sophisticated investors do not require such protection, at least if they enjoy
access to the types of information that registration provides; the SEC
assumes that wealthy investors, simply because of their wealth, need no
protection at all. Both of these assumptions require more scrutiny than
they have received.
On a more fundamental level, the SEC's and Congress's attempts to
exempt securities offered and sold to sophisticated investors have created
a legal paradox: the scheme requires registration of securities offered to
unsophisticatedinvestors, thus ensuring that people who do not read pro275. Id.
276. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(iii), 230.501(a) (1988); see supra note 264 and accompanying
text.
277. See, e.g., Securities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158, 9159 (1961) (defining

scope of 1933 Act section 3(a)(3) exemption question by whether instruments are of type not ordinarily purchased by general public, itself defined in terms of sophistication); Welch Foods Inc. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (interpreting section 3(a)(10)
exemption in same terms). Some state exemptions also turn on investor sophistication. See, eg.,
McConnell v. Surak, 774 F.2d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois exemption for sales to certain sophisticated institutional investors interpreted not to include sales to partnerships); Rochambeau v. Brent
Exploration, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 381, 385 (D. Colo. 1978) (interpreting state private placement exemp-

tion in COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-114(2)(i) (1973), amended by CoLO. REV. STAT. § 11-41-113(a)(i)
(1987), to turn on offeree's sophistication and access to information).
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spectuses receive copies of them, but exempts securities offered to sophisticated investors who would read and benefit from prospectuses if they
received them. A legal structure that creates such anomaly demands
reconsideration.
I. Proxy Fraudand the Sophisticated Investor.
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits any solicitation of proxies
that violates SEC rules. 278 Rule 14a-9 forbids the use of proxy materials
that contain false or misleading statements, or misleading omissions, of
material facts. 279 Investor sophistication can become an issue in Rule
14a-9 cases in at least two ways.
The first involves the definition of an actionable falsehood. Courts
are split over the relevance of plaintiffs' sophistication to the issue
whether statements or omissions were actually false or misleading. The
actual falsehood inquiry poses no problem: a listener's characteristics
cannot alter the objective truth or falsity of a matter. Considering
whether a statement or omission is "misleading," however, necessarily
involves a listener's qualities: a statement cannot mislead unless a listener is capable of being misled. As a result, some courts apply a higher
standard of deceptiveness for statements to sophisticated plaintiffs than
for statements to unsophisticated ones. For example, in Pierre J LeLandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., statements contained in the proxy
statement at issue were held not misleading because the sophisticated
280
plaintiffs involved should not have been misled.
278. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
279. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988):
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement,

form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any
statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made,
is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material

fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary
to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
A private right of action for Rule 14a-9 violations has long existed. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite

Co., 396 U.S. 375, 382-83 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964).
280. 387 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 421
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); see also Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337, 1349

(2d Cir. 1971) (statement that would mislead unsophisticated investors may not mislead sophisticated investors).
The same sort of rationale might apply to allegedly misleading omissions. As the Second Circuit pointed out in Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)), "there is no duty to
disclose information to one who reasonably would already be aware of it." Cf Indiana Nat'l Bank v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 578 F.2d 180, 184-85 (7th Cir. 1978) (language in tender offer statement not deceptive where all plaintiffs were sophisticated investors who should have understood challenged

language).
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A more convincing group of proxy fraud cases considers the sophistication of all the recipients of the proxy materials at issue, not just the
individual plaintiff's sophistication. Thus, in Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., 281
the court noted that the plaintiffs were all sophisticated investors, none of
whom had been duped. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs recovered because the
same materials might have misled other, less sophisticated, recipients. 2 82
The Clayton result, is clearly correct. For a proxy statement to have the
harm that Rule 14a-9 proscribes, it need only mislead some of its recipients. If the materials mislead a majority of voting shareholders, the majority's misguided action may harm the sophisticated plaintiffs even if
they themselves were not misled.
Investor sophistication also presents an issue under Rule 14a-9's
materiality requirement. As in the Rule lOb-5 context, the relevance of
sophistication under Rule 14a-9 depends on whether the Rule creates a
subjective standard of materiality or an objective one.
In TSC Industries v. North way, Inc., 28 3 the Supreme Court held that
a misstatement or omission qualifies as material under Rule 14a-9 when
there is
a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
"total mix" of information made available. 2 84
As discussed above, 285 this passage fails to resolve the choice between a
subjective and an objective standard; not surprisingly, courts have split in
determining the relevance of investor sophistication under Rule 14a-9's
materiality requirement.
As with the other areas in which issues of investor sophistication
arise, a coherent theory for the treatment of sophistication under the federal securities laws would do much to alleviate judicial discord in the
interpretation of Rule 14a-9.
J. The SophisticatedInvestor and the Definition of "Tender Offer."
Judicial discord fades as courts determine whether, under the Williams Act, 286 a stock purchase plan that is targeted at sophisticated investors involves a tender offer. The Williams Act and the SEC rules
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 96,269 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1977).
Id. at 92,746-47.
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
Id. at 449.
See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (1982).
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promulgated thereunder provide extensive regulation of tender offers.
This complex regulatory scheme applies whenever a party makes a
tender offer for a specified percentage of a 1934 Act registrant's equity
securities. 287 The Williams Act, however, refrains from defining the term
"tender offer," reflecting the SEC's view that "the term is to be interpreted flexibly" in light of the "dynamic nature of these transactions."2 88
Courts have therefore defined the term themselves, often focusing on
offeree sophistication in the process. In determining whether a transaction is a tender offer, courts use three main types of tests. The most
common of these, enunciated in Wellman v. Dickinson, gives the first of
many characteristics of a tender offer: "active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer. 2 8 9 In applying
this test, courts have considered offerees' sophistication. As these decisions indicate, solicitation of a small number of sophisticated investors
does not amount to a "widespread solicitation of public shareholders"
and thus does not constitute a tender offer. 290 In Hanson Trust PLC v.
SCM Corp., for example, the Second Circuit found no tender offer in
open-market purchases by a former tender offeror only hours after an
official tender offer was withdrawn.2 9 1 The court based its decision on
the fact that the buyer purchased his stocks privately from extremely
sophisticated investors who did not need the Williams Act's
292
protections.
Similarly, in Hoover Co. v. FuquaIndustries,293 the court applied the
Wellman test in a situation involving mainly unsophisticated offerees.
Given the offerees' lack of sophistication, the court decided that the offerees did constitute "public shareholders" under the Wellman test's first
part, and held that the case involved a tender offer.294
The second variety of tender offer test focuses on the motivation
behind the Williams Act. The Act regulates tender offers in order to
eliminate the unreasoned stampedes that such offers commonly engen287. For a concise description of the statutory and regulatory scheme, see L. Loss, supra note
123, at 507-41.
288. Exchange Act Release No. 12,676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,659, at 86,696 (Aug. 2, 1976).
289. 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
290. See, e.g., Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,882, at 95,633 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1979); Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %96,403, at 93,429 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 1978); see also
Beaumont v. American Can Co., 621 F. Supp. 484, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no tender offer where
solicitations made only to institutions, presumably sophisticated), aff'd, 797 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1986).
291. 774 F.2d 47, 58-60 (2d Cir. 1985).
292. See id. at 57.
293. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %97,107 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1979).
294. Id. at 96,149.
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der, an effect particularly harsh to unsophisticated investors.295 In light
of this motivation, the court in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp. defined a tender offer as "any offer to purchase securities likely to
pressure shareholders into making uninformed, ill-considered decisions
to sell." '296 The Kennecott court, applying this definition, held that no
tender offer existed because the offerees were
largely institutions who were unlikely to be forced into uninformed, illconsidered decisions. These sophisticated investors have at hand large
reservoirs of financial knowledge and capable staffs able to evaluate the
pros and cons of a particular sale. In short, they are hardly the uninformed security holder unable
to fend for himself, who needs the pro297
tection of the Williams Act.
The third definition of tender offer, properly understood, also depends on investor sophistication. In S-G SecuritiesInc. v. FuquaInvestment Co., the court declared that a tender offer occurs whenever "there
is: 1) a publicly announced intention by the purchaser to acquire a substantial block of the stock of the target company for purposes of acquiring control thereof, and 2) a subsequent rapid acquisition by the
purchaser of large blocks of stock through open market and privately
negotiated purchases. '298 The court justified this test by noting that a
public announcement creates a "risk of the pressure on sellers that the
disclosure and remedial tender offer provisions of the Williams Act were
designed to prevent. '2 99 A court would be well advised to apply this test
not mechanically, but by examining the sophistication of the offerees involved, since the risk of undue pressure to tender varies inversely with
the sophistication of the offerees. Developed in light of the principles
behind the Williams Act, the test should protect only those whom the
Act seeks to protect.
No matter how a court defines the term "tender offer," offeree sophistication remains a crucial point of inquiry. Moreover, the interplay
295. See, e.g., Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. RaV. 1250, 1259, 1279 & n.133 (1973); Note, Front-End Loaded Tender
Offers: The Application of Federaland State Law to an Innovative CorporateAcquisition Technique,

131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 409 (1982). Lucian Bebchuk has suggested that the Williams Act does not
sufficiently protect unsophisticated investors during the tender offer process. Bebchuk argues that
unsophisticated investors are less likely to be aware of bids and less able to deliver their shares in
time. They are thus forced to accept the post-takeover value of their minority shares instead of the
higher bid price. Because of better information and better means for delivering their share certificates, sophisticated investors are less likely to suffer this fate. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice andEqual Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1706-07, 1735 n.100,
1781-88 (1985).
296. 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y.) (quoting Note, supra note 295, at 1281), aff'd in partand
rev'd in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
297. Id.
298. 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1126-27 (D. Mass. 1978).
299. Id. at 1126.
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between the Williams Act's policy concerns and offeree sophistication
hints at a more effective general treatment of sophisticated investors
3°°
under the securities laws.

K. The Definition of "Security" and the Sophisticated Investor.
No topic has a greater impact on securities regulation than the definition of a "security." Sections 2(1) of the 1933 Act 30 1 and 3(a)(10) of
the 1934 Act 30 2 both define the term. Each section contains a list of

items that constitute securities and then licenses judicial development of
these working definitions by including the prefatory phrase "unless the
context otherwise requires. ' 30 3 Investor sophistication often plays a role
as courts apply these definitions to specific fact patterns.
300. See infra notes 315-84 and accompanying text.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982):
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
302. The 1934 Act's definition differs only slightly from the 1933 Act's:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of
interest or other participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate
of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national
securities exchange relating to a foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation or, temporary interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982); id. § 78c(a). Some have argued that the so-called "context clauses"
do not in fact invite courts to limit the list of devices defined as securities in given factual contexts;
instead, they suggest that the context clauses refer to textual contexts. See, eg., Steinberg &
Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of "Security'" The "Context" Clause, "Investment
Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV.489, 504-18 (1987). These arguments involve a meaningless distinction. Under the context clauses, an ordinary general partnership
agreement, although a "profit sharing agreement," is not usually a security. See, eg., Rivanna
Trawlers Unltd. v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1378, 1383-85 (W.D. Va. 1986). This
result occurs either because of the factual context in which such contracts arise or because the substantive statutory provision "otherwise requires" in the particular case. Either way, a court may
legitimately hold that such a profit-sharing agreement is not a security under the context clauses.
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One such pattern involves "investment contracts," an instrument
that both the 1933 and 1934 Act definitions list as a security. In SEC v.
Howey, the Supreme Court characterized investment contracts in terms

that necessitate an inquiry into investor sophistication: "In other words,
an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party. .... ,,304 Over time, courts have refined the

Howey test into three elements: (1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise with (3) an expectation of profits that will be derived
from others' efforts. 305 Investor sophistication affects the third part of
the test, which requires a court to consider "the dependency of the inves-

tor on the entrepreneurial or managerial skills of a promoter or third
party. '30 6 Where a case involves sophisticated purchasers or investors,
courts are less likely to find an expectation to derive profits from the

promoter's efforts. In FBS Financial,Inc. v. CleveTrust Realty Investors,
for example, the court held a subparticipation in a loan not to be a secur-

ity, since the plaintiff relied on its own sophistication, and not the managerial efforts of others, in structuring the participation. 30 7 The court

reached a similar result in Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson
Trawlers Inc., 30 holding that a general partnership interest in a venture
was not a security. Based on the sophistication of the general partner
purchasers, the-court noted that the plaintiffs were sophisticated enough
to exercise control over the venture and held that they failed to satisfy
30 9
the Howey test's third prong.
Although investor sophistication affects the definition of "security"

primarily in investment contract cases, it comes into play in other contexts as well. For example, in United CaliforniaBank v. THC Financial
304. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
305. See, eg., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 1974).
306. Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
307. [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,341, at 93,145, 93,159-60 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 23, 1977). In Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,499, at 98,520-21 (W.D. Okla. May 17, 1984), the court held that a loan participation
was not a security, and had strong words for sophisticated plaintiffs who try to convert their contract
claims into federal securities claims: "Public policy dictates that sophisticated investors such as
these... not be allowed to harass on fanciful bases financial institutions which are merely performing the functions that society and the law have created for them." Id. at 98,520.
308. 650 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988).
309. Id. at 1385. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424-25 (5th Cir.) (plaintiffs' ability to exercise control over enterprise is one
factor demonstrating that their interest not a security), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); see also
Note, General Partnership Interests as Securities Under the Federal Securities Laws: Substance Over
Form, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 324-26 (1985) (recommending that sophistication of purchasing
general partner be considered in deciding whether partnership interest is a security).
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Corp.,3 10 the transaction at issue involved a sale of certain notes, together
with a "put" letter. The Ninth Circuit held that the transaction did not
involve a security, given the sale's commercial nature and the purchaser's

sophistication. As the court stated, "[t]his is not the situation where an
'311
unsophisticated investor lacked access to inside financial information.
The same court also recently held that interests in oil well leases do not

managerial powconstitute securities when the investors enjoy significant
'312
ers and have "a high degree of business acumen.
Thus, whether a case concerns an investment contract or some other

putative security, courts are likely to focus on investor sophistication in
characterizing the investment at issue. 313 Despite this focus, however,

courts make virtually no attempt to justify the relevance of investor sophistication to their analyses. In reading these cases, one develops an
impression that judges have a feeling that purchaser sophistication somehow makes a case different from a typical securities case but are unable

to articulate a principle that would legitimately make sophistication an
issue.
L. Judicial Treatment of Investor Sophistication and the Need for a
Unifying Theory.

So far this part has identified eleven major areas of securities law
affected by investor sophistication: there are others as well.3 14 Indeed,
the wide-ranging impact of investor sophistication makes the absence of a

unifying theory for the role of sophistication all the more remarkable.
Courts that find sophistication relevant seem not to recognize that their
de facto distinctions are part of a larger phenomenon; almost no cross-

reference among these different types of cases seems to be occurring.
310. 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
311. Id. at 1358.
312. Deutsch Energy Co. v. Mazur, 813 F.2d 1567, 1570 (9th Cir. 1987); see also South Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Darmstadter, 622 F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.S.C. 1985) (boxcars not securities, in part
because buyer "an educated, sophisticated businessperson well within her areas of business expertise"); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (D. Colo. 1970) (restaurant
franchise not security, in part because franchise purchasers usually sophisticated businesspeople),
aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
313. But cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 159 (1984) (rejecting
argument that commercial paper is not security for purposes of Glass-Steagall Act because it is
purchased primarily by sophisticated investors: "In its prohibition on commercial-bank underwriting, the Act admits of no exception according to the particular investment expertise of the
customer.").
314. For example, sophistication is relevant in criminal cases in which the government must
allege willful misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 641 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp. 993, 1009 (C.D. Cal.
1972); see also SEC v. Cooper, 402 F. Supp. 516, 521-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding sophistication
relevant in SEC enforcement action).
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Moreover, even within the various categories of cases, confusion and
sometimes outright disagreement over the relevance of sophistication
characterize the courts' inquiries.
Despite this dissaray, it remains possible-and indeed necessary-to
develop a coherent set of unifying principles that will justify this disparate treatment.
II.

TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY FOR THE TREATMENT OF

SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS

Any theory justifying the distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors must rest on the principles behind the securities
laws. This part examines those principles and demonstrates how they
can guide courts in applying the securities laws to sophisticated investors.
To facilitate accurate application of these principles by courts, an appendix to this Article will present a set of criteria to help judges determine
investors' level of sophistication.
A.

Whom Do the Securities Laws Protect?

Underlying the confused judicial treatment of sophisticated investors is a fundamental disagreement about whom the securities laws protect. Courts not only disagree about the relevance of investor
sophistication, they disagree whether the securities laws protect sophisticated investors in the first place.
1. The HistoricalMotivation. As a historical matter, Congress
did not design the securities laws to protect investors capable of protecting themselves. The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts reflects
three general concerns. First, Congress was concerned that the average
investor was being fleeced in the financial markets by inadequate disclosure, misrepresentation, and manipulative schemes. 3 15
Second, Congress worried that predation on individual investors
would lead to other, second-order, problems, including a generalized loss
of confidence in our capital markets, our financial system, and even in
our form of government. As Congressman Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.) put it:
When a people's faith is shaken in a business the business becomes
halting and lame; when a people lose faith and confidence in the men
who administer the government it follows as the night the day they
lose faith in government. Only one thing can follow in the wake of this
315. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in 1 SECURITIEs LAW
COMM., FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 154, at 710-11; S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1933),
reprintedin 1 SECURITiEs LAW COMM., FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 154, at 89; 77 CONG. REc. 937
(1933) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mar. 29, 1933).
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destroyed confidence, that is, lack of support; and in its wake must

follow the evils that attend socialism, bolshevism, and communism. 316
In addition, some voiced concerns that "honest business" suffered from a
competitive disadvantage in the capital markets when faced with unscrupulous sellers of inferior securities. 317 Others were concerned that industry's ability to sell securities to a guileless public was fueling an
expansion of industry without regard to need. 318 We should not lose
sight of the derivative nature of these concerns: Congress perceived a
failure of confidence to be the systemic effect of multiple abuses of individual investors. Likewise, "honest" businesses' competitive disadvantage and unnecessary expansion of production capacity resulted from
firms' ability to hawk unsound securities to an unwitting public.
Third, Congress was concerned about the extent to which excess
margin was draining the nation's credit resources away from other areas
of commerce, 319 and intended that the 1934 Act's margin provisions
would stop that drain and would protect investors from their own excess
20
leverage.3
Each provision in the 1933 and 1934 Acts reflects one or more of
these concerns. Indeed, except for the 1934 Act's margin provisions, the
Acts' legislative history shows that nearly every provision was motivated,
either directly or indirectly, by concerns with predation on individual
investors.
When legislatures enact a statute based on a desire to protect, they
will design that statute to reach only those who are perceived to require
protection. If the statute also draws others under its protective umbrella,
that results only from the legislature's inability to tailor the statute's protection perfectly to the class in need of protection. Justice Stevens recognized this situation in his Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth dissent. 321 In
that case, the Court rejected the "sale of business" doctrine and held that
ordinary common stock is always a security, even when a sale of a business simply uses a stock sale as a medium. Justice Stevens argued in
316. 77 CONG. REc. 2919 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn).

317. See 77 CONG. REc. 2983 (remarks of Sen. Fletcher) (one purpose of 1933 Act was to "protect honest enterprise ... against the competition afforded by questionable securities offered to the
public through crooked promotion"); id. at 2935 (remarks of Rep. Chapman) (one purpose of 1933
Act was to protect "honest corporate business" from "illegitimate competition of financial
racketeers").
318. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1933), reprinted in I SECURrriEs LAW
COMM., FED. BAR Ass'N, supra note 154, at 139.

319.
COMM,,
320.
1934).
321.

See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934), reprinted in I SEcuRrrmEs LAW
FED. BAR ASS'N, supra note 154, at 710-11.
See 78 CONG. REc. 2264 (1934) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 9,
471 U.S. 681, 698 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dissent that "[a]t some level of analysis, the policy of Congress must provide the basis for placing limits on the coverage of the Securities
Acts. ' 322 He then identified Congress's policy: "I believe that Congress
wanted to protect investors who do not have access to inside information
and who are not in a position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appropriate contractual warranties. ' 32 3 In light of that policy,
Justice Stevens suggested that a business purchaser's sophistication provided enough protection.
Justice Stevens's statement of policy, moreover, expresses a proposition almost universally accepted by the judiciary: Congress enacted the

securities laws, except the margin rules, in order to protect those who
cannot protect themselves, 324 and not to relieve sophisticated investors
from the consequences of their bad investments. 325 The systemic aims of
the statutes are merely derivative of the congressional goal of protecting
those who cannot protect themselves. 326 As the Ninth Circuit has said:
"The purpose of the [1934 Act] is to protect the innocent investor, not
one who loses his innocence and then waits to see how his investment
'327
turns out before he decides to invoke the provisions of the Act.
The operative question, though, remains: what practical consequences, if any, should follow from our understanding of Congress's
motivations? On this point the courts are stuck. Many hold that since
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 834 (7th Cir.
1977); Verace v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gammage
v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %94,760, at 96,501
(S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see
also Neville, supra note 180, at 7 ("[lIt is clear that the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor." (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953))). But
see Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 373 (10th Cir. 1973) ("The statute is intended to promote full
disclosure to every investor regardless of his particular business background."); Newman v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 383 F. Supp. 265, 268 (W.D. Tex. 1974) ("The federal securites laws do not
distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, and the protections afforded by
[the] antifraud and registration provisions are designed for all investors, whether sophisticated or
unsophisticated.").
325. See Dahl v. Pinter, 787 F.2d 985, 995 (5th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 108
S. Ct. 2063 (1988); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977); Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Darmstadter, 622
F. Supp. 226, 231 (D.S.C. 1985), aff'd, 813 F.2d 403 (1986); Eriksson v. Galvin, 484 F. Supp. 1108,
1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Of course, even investors sophisticated for most purposes may become unsophisticated if they lack access to crucial information. See, eg., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 1226, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Both § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 are designed to protect the unwary
from the unscrupulous. In addition, they attempt to insure that even the most sophisticated investor
is not duped simply because he is not privy to information available only to a favored few."), aff'd,
565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
326. See supra note 315-20.
327. Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
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Congress designed the securities laws to protect unsophisticated investors, the sophisticated are entitled to no protection. 32 8 Others refuse to
limit the securities laws in this way. Although the Fifth Circuit in Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc. recognized that "one of the essential pur'32 9
poses of the [1933] Act is to protect innocent purchasers of securities,
and found that the defendant did not fall within that protected group, the
court nonetheless permitted recovery under the 1933 Act. 330 The five
propositions developed in section B below provide a basis for alleviating
this kind of confusion.
2.

The Textual Provisions. In contrast to Congress's historical

motivations for enacting securities statutes, the literal language of the
securities laws rarely distinguishes between the sophisticated and the unsophisticated. As Justice Douglas's dissent in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co. correctly observed, the 1934 Act "does not speak in terms of 'sophis-

ticated' as opposed to 'unsophisticated' people dealing securities.

' 331

In

fact, many courts have perceived that the securities laws' language is de-

liberately evenhanded on the issue of investor sophistication; these courts
have made such declarations as "sophisticated investors, like all others,
are entitled to the truth. '332 Other courts often advert to statutory lahguage in concluding that "[l]arge as well as small investors are protected
by the Securities Acts. ' 333 Still others refer to specific statutory sections
328. See, e.g., Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1075, 109397 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusing to recognize sophisticated investor's private right of action for Regulation T violations); Hirsch, 553 F.2d at 760 (refusing to permit sophisticated investor's recovery for
alleged violations of New York Stock Exchange rules); Verace, 478 F. Supp. at 1064-65 (refusing to
permit action by sophisticated investor under section 6 of 1934 Act).
329. 461 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1972).
330. Id.
331. 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
332. Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Nor-Tex Agencies, Inc. v.
Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973) (quoting Stier); Quincy Co-op. Bank v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, 655 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Mass. 1986) ("sophisticated investors no less than naive ones are
entitled to receive correct, material information"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); In re Olympia
Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) %92,461, at 92,819
(N.D. I1. Nov. 13, 1985) ("The sophistication of the investor is immaterial when it comes to plaintiffs' claims based upon misrepresentations and omissions."); Stoller v. Baldwin-United Corp., [19851986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec, L. Rep. (CCH) 92,298, at 92,031 n.12 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 1985)
("it is clear that 'sophisticated investors' are entitled to the protection of the securities laws"); Spatz
v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("securities laws entitle all investors, both the
experienced and the novice, to the full and truthful disclosure of material information"); Welch
Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Stier); Barthe
v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
333. Welch Foods, 398 F. Supp. at 1398-99; see also Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir.
1976) ("even sophisticated investors are entitled to the protections of [Rule lOb-5]"); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay
Streets are.., entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders."), cert denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
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and note the absence of any distinctions based on investor
334
sophistication.
As this discussion suggests, two general lines of cases exist. One
emphasizes Congress's motivation, and the other the statutes themselves.

Although the lines may appear to run in opposition, they are in fact entirely consistent with each another, and also correct in and of themselves.
B.

Five PropositionsJustifying Disparate Treatment of Sophisticated
and UnsophisticatedInvestors.

The five interrelated points that follow will demonstrate how the
historical motivation of the securities laws-protecting those in need of
protection-relates to the undeniable evenhandedness of the statutory
texts. The propositions will indicate how, in light of that relationship,
courts should apply the securities laws to sophisticated investors.
1. Proposition One: Using PrinciplistModels Correctly. The first
proposition concerns textual interpretation: there exists a proper relationship between a statute's motivating principles and its text; this relationship, if understood, can guide the statute's application.
In standard principlist modeling, 335 all statutes consist of three elements: a rule, that rule's motivating principles, and the proper zone of
application for that rule. The rule is the statutory text itself. The rule's
principles consist most often (although not necessarily 336) of the statute's
historical motivation. The zone of application refers to the statute's
boundaries as courts have applied it over time. A hypothetical statute
will illustrate these elements and their proper relationship.
Consider a statute that declares that "no one may walk on the
grass." The quoted language expresses the rule, and behind that rule,
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %92,931, at 94,549 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1986) ("The securities laws afford protection to all investors, both sophisticated and unsophisticated."); In re Scientific Control Corp. Sec.
Litig., 71 F.R.D. 491, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("As a general matter, the securities laws do not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors .... ); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F.
Supp. 439, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (Securities regulations "are for the protection of the entire public,
including a careless sophisticate, and not just for the ignorant."), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970);
cf Moe v. Coe, 124 Or. 436, 438-39, 263 P. 925, 925-26 (1928) (sophisticated investors entitled to
protection of state blue sky laws).
334. See, eg., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Section
12(2) does not establish a graduated scale of duty depending upon the sophistication and access to
information of the customer."); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 696
(5th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff's sophistication provides no defense to section 12(2) liability).
335. "Principlism" is the uncontroversial belief that we can use the principles behind a statutory
text to improve our understanding of the text. For a more complete discussion of the use of principles in statutory application, see Fletcher, PrinciplistModels in the Analysis of Constitutionaland
Statutory Texts, 72 IowA L. REv. 891, 894-99 (1987).
336. See id. at 899-900.
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several possible principles may exist. Perhaps a relatively narrow principle such as "croquet ruins the grass" motivated the rule's adoption. Alternatively, a much broader principle may lie behind the rule, such as
"grass is sacred." The rule's zone of application will include some, and
exclude other, conduct; the statute will prohibit only the conduct named
in the statute. Thus, walking across the grass would fall within the zone
of application and be prohibited, whereas walking on the pavement immediately adjacent to the grass would neither fall within the zone nor be
prohibited.
When applied correctly, a statute's three elements-rule, principle,
and zone of application-stand in a certain relation to one another.
Courts apply statutes erroneously by misunderstanding the nature of this
relation among the elements. One common misconception involves what
I call "conical principlism." Under this model, one allows a discovered
principle, rather than the rule itself, to dictate the scope of the zone of
337
application.
Assume, for example, that historical investigation into our hypothetical statute leads to the conclusion that the principle that "grass is
sacred" motivated the rule that "no one may walk on the grass." In light
of this principle, would the rule apply if a person sat on the immediately
adjacent pavement and pulled up a handful of grass? The answer is
clearly no: this person has not walked on the grass. A conical
principlist, however, would argue that the rule does apply and has been
violated. In his view, the scope of the principle must determine the zone
of application, and the conduct here impinges on the principle of sacredness. The conical priniciplist's mistake is to posit an illegitimate relation
between rule, principle, and zone of application. This mistake occurs
repeatedly in both statutory and constitutional interpretation, including
338
interpretation of the securities laws.
In the proper relation between these three elements, the rule itself,
and not the principle, determines the zone of application. 339 Thus, in our
example, the grass-puller's conduct falls outside the zone of application
because that zone can sweep no wider than the rule itself. Unless conduct involves walking on the grass, it is not within the rule's zone of
application and therefore cannot violate the statute. 34° The principle behind the rule might suggest that other conduct is morally reprehensible,
337. See id. at 902-19.
338. See Id. at 910-13 (discussing mistakes made in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
339. I term this relation "reflexive principlism." See Fletcher, supra note 335, at 899.
340. Of course, difficult cases might allow debate over whether the person has in fact "walked"

on the grass. Suppose, for example, that the person does a cartwheel across the grass or crawls
across the grass. Is that conduct within the rule? Perhaps; perhaps not. In such cases we must use
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but this may be said of many types of conduct that violates no legal rules.
The legislature, then, faces the challenge of drafting rules that accurately
reflect the principles behind them.
2. Proposition Two: Taking Text Seriously. Understanding the
first proposition-that there exists a proper relation between a statute's
rule, principles, and zone of application-provides a foundation for the
second proposition: courts may not legitimately refuse to give sophisticated investors the benefit of rights of action expressly granted by the
securities laws.
One cannot overstate the importance, in applying a statute, of understanding the proper relation between the statute's three elements; only
such an understanding leads to a legitimate application. In the case of
the securities laws, such an understanding tells us that where a statutory
provision gives all investors a private right of action, courts may not
narrow that rule's application by claiming that a narrow principle, such
as protecting only unsophisticated investors, motivates the statute. Returning to our hypothetical statute, assume that the rule "no one may
walk on the grass" is motivated by a narrow principle: "croquet ruins
the grass." Just as non-croquet-players who trample the grass face penalties, so too must sophisticated investors enjoy private rights of action.
Under this proposition, we can reconcile those cases in which courts
emphasize narrow principles behind the securities laws 341 with those in
which courts point out that statutory texts themselves draw no distinction between investors based on sophistication. 342 True, Congress's enactment of the broad provisions of 1933 and 1934 Acts primarily reflects
Congress's belief that those not capable of protecting themselves deserve
protection, but that does not alter the fact that the texts of those provisions do not distinguish between the sophisticated and the unsophisticated. Thus, cases such as Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co. ,343 which hold
that sophisticated investors can raise claims under the express liability
provisions of 1933 Act section 12(2), are clearly rightly decided. 344 What
Congress gives, the courts may not take away by the expedient of interthe tools of statutory construction. But the use of these tools does not alter the conclusion that the
perceived principle behind a rule cannot dictate the scope of the rule's application. See id. at 934-39.
341. See supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
343. 619 F.2d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
344. See also Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting
sophisticated investor to recover under section 12(1) of 1933 Act even though "one of the essential
purposes of the Act is to protect innnocent purchasers of securities ... and though [plaintiff] is
certainly not the average innocent investor").
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pretation in light of motivating principles. 345
3. Proposition Three: Treating Dissimilar Parties Differently.
Proposition three holds that courts may legitimately treat sophisticated
investors differently even with respect to express rights of action. This
proposition accepts the second proposition's validity, but recognizes that
true evenhandedness requires us to apply statutes differently in different
circumstances. Only a false equality would call on us to apply a neutral
principle of law to all actors in an identical fashion. True equality requires us to acknowledge that different circumstances dictate different
results.
For that reason, courts that apply the securities laws' sophisticationneutral texts to sophisticated investors may, notwithstanding the texts'
neutrality, continue to acknowledge differences in application of the law
between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. For example, given
the proper facts, section 12(1) of the 1933 Act entitles any investor to sue
346
for rescission after a sale of unregistered, nonexempt securities.
Whether such securities are exempt, however, may legitimately depend
3 47
on an offeree's sophistication.
Similarly, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides an express right of
action for an investor who purchases securities from a person who makes
material misstatements or omissions in connection with the sale. 348 Any
purchaser, sophisticated or not, enjoys this right of action. 349 However,
by providing a defense if a purchaser knew of the untruth or omission at
the time of his purchase, 350 section 12(2) requires courts to examine sophisticated investors' claims under a brighter light. Because sophisticated investors are more likely to know of untruths or omissions, their
section 12(2) claims fail more frequently than those of unsophisticated
investors.
In addition, to take up the class action issue discussed above, 351 sophisticated investors can act as class representatives under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;352 courts cannot disqualify sophisticated investors from acting as class representatives solely because of their
345. Accord Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (courts cannot impose
prior criminal conviction requirement in civil RICO actions; such requirement is inconsistent with

statute's language and legislative history and would frustrate congressional purpose).
346. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1982).
347. See supra notes 236-77 and accompanying text.
348. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
349. See, e.g., Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1229.
350. Id.
351. See supra notes 182-210 and accompanying text.
352. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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sophistication, since the rule provides for no such exclusion. 353 But in
certain types of class actions-those involving questions of due diligence
or reliance-a sophisticated investor might face unique defenses that
3 54
would prevent him from satisfying Rule 23's typicality requirement.
Given Rule 23's wording, courts cannot deny all sophisticated investors
eligibility to represent classes, but in individual cases, sophistication may
make an investor an improper class representative.
Likewise, statutes of limitations make no sophistication-based distinctions; they impose the same time limits whether plaintiffs are sophisticated or not.355 In applying statutes of limitations, however, courts
must treat sophisticated and unsophisticated investors differently. For
example, section 13 of the 1933 Act 356 requires a plaintiff to file suit
within a certain period of time after a claim arises, and courts apply a
due diligence test to determine when a plaintiff should have discovered
his claim (which is when the claim is considered to have arisen). Of
course, what a diligent sophisticated investor should discover will differ
from what a diligent but unsophisticated investor should discover. Thus,
although the 1933 Act's limitations provisions make no distinction based
on sophistication, sophisticated investors will, as a practical matter, often
face a shorter limitations period than will the unsophisticated.
In short, although courts must give sophisticated investors an opportunity to state a claim as long as the statute at issue does not expressly
exclude sophisticated investors, courts may-and indeed must, if they are
to decide cases justly- continue to treat sophisticated and unsophisticated investors differently. The rules and standards are the same for both
types of investors, but these rules and standards differ as applied.
4. Proposition Four: Applying Judicially Created Law. Proposition four holds that courts may legitimately refuse to permit sophisticated investors to pursue implied causes of action under the federal
securities laws. This proposition relates to the second proposition, which
recognizes that statutory texts impose certain obligations on courts. As a
corollary to that proposition, courts may legitimately treat sophisticated
investors distinctively under judge-made law.
353. See, e.g., Darvin v. International Harvester Co., 610 F. Supp. 255, 258 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The Court rejects the suggestion that plaintiff's status as a sophisticated investor is, in and of itself,
sufficient to warrant denial of his application to represent the class .... "); Fisher v. Plessey Co., 103
F.R.D. 150, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (sophisticated investors may represent classes in class actions); In

re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 150 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (class representative not disqualified merely
because he was an active securities trader and vice president of corporation).
354. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
355. The treatment of sophisticated investors under statutes of limitations is discussed supra
notes 211-35 and accompanying text.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
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Although a formalistic view of the federal government might portray Congress as lawmaker and the judiciary as law-interpreter, courts
undoubtedly make law in at least three ways: (1) by implying rights of
action under statutory provisions that grant no express rights of action;
(2) by fleshing out vague statutory provisions whose substantive detail
Congress has intentionally left to the judiciary; and (3) by developing
legal doctrine outside any express statutory mandate. In developing
judge-made law, courts attempt to tailor the application of such law in
light of its motivating principles. 35 7 Thus, courts can apply judicially
created securities law in a manner that protects only those who need
protection. In other words, courts can legitimately limit the reach of
such law to unsophisticated investors. Exploring this proposition with
respect to each type of judicially created law will prove fruitful.
Under the first category, judges may limit their grants of implied
rights of action to those whom a statutory provision is intended to protect. 358 For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., a federal district court recognized an implied action for damages under Rule lOb-5
for the first time, limiting the action to certain categories of plaintiffs:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or
by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of
an interest of another if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively
or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and (b)
the interest
invaded is one which the enactment is intended to
359
protect.

In other words, the court granted a private right of action under section
10(b) only to plaintiffs within a class that the statute was intended to
protect.
More recent cases have recognized this principle of limitation in
connection with the treatment of sophisticated investors. In Stern v.
MerrillLynch, Pierce,Fenner& Smith, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that
even if an implied private right of action for Regulation T violations existed, sophisticated plaintiffs would be denied that right. 36° The court
357. See, eg., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976) ("The judiciary having
created a private cause of action [under Rule lOb-5] soon sensed a need to limit and define it."); see
also PrivatizingDisputes, supra note 167, at 428 ("When investor protection is judicially created, the
judiciary can and must limit that protection to those whose need prompted the enactment of the

securities laws: individual investors not sophisticated enough to protect themselves adequately.").
358. Judges cannot, however, limit rights of action that Congress expressly provides. See supra

notes 342-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the history of implied rights of action
under the federal securities laws and the proper role of sophistication in a court's analysis of implied

rights of action, see Comment, supra note 156.
359. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)); see
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (citing Kardon as first case
recognizing private right of action under Rule lOb-5).
360. 603 F.2d 1073, 1093 (4th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the most compelling basis for such a right of action under Regulation T. According to
the Restatement, if a statutory violation causes an injury, a plaintiff may
recover only if he falls within the class whose interests the statute seeks
to protect.36 1 The court reasoned that since the Federal Reserve Board
enacted Regulation T 362 to protect unsophisticated investors, the plaintiff, as a sophisticated investor, fell outside the protected class and could
claim no entitlement to the private right of action. 363 The court in Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co. reached the same conclusion, noting that
Regulation T was designed to protect "innocent lambs," a characterization that clearly did not apply to the plaintiff in that case. 364 As a historical matter, these cases rest on the erroneous assumption that the margin
rules exist solely to protect unsophisticated investors from excess leverage. In fact, Congress sought to restrict margin primarily to inhibit
available credit from being diverted from what Congress saw as more
productive uses. 365 The point, however, is not that the above cases were
rightly decided, but that they reflect sound methodology. A court may
legitimately restrict a private right of action in light of perceived
policy.

366

As examples of the second type of judicially created law, Richard
Danzig has argued that article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code represents a call to judicial activism, 367 "a renunciation of legislative responsibility and power. ' 36 8 Michael Perry has argued that the Constitution is
in many respects an empty vessel that leaves courts free to propound
"general, fundamental ethical principles for the moral education and gui'369
dance of the political processes.
The securities laws contain many empty vessels; those provisions
give courts opportunities to exclude sophisticated investors from statutory protections. For example, Congress clearly intended the definitions
361. 603 F.2d at 1075.
362. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.130 (1988), promulgated under authority granted to the
Federal Reserve Board in section 7 o" the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1982), contains the Board's
margin limitations.
363. 603 F.2d at 1075. The court's lengthy discussion of the plaintiff's sophistication is notable.
See id. at 1093-97.
364. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,760, at 96,501 (S.D. Cal. June
13, 1974).
365. See supra notes 319-20.
366. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 74849 (1975); DMI Furniture,
Inc. v. Brown, Kraft & Co., 644 F. Supp. 1517, 1528 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
367. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 621, 634-35 (1975).
368. Id. at 622.
369. Perry,Abortion, The Public Morals, andthe Police Power: The Ethical Function ofSubstantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 716 (1976).
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of "security" in the 1933 and 1934 Acts 370 as empty vessels into which
courts would pour content.37 1 Those definitions contain long lists of instruments that are, prima facie, securities. But each definition also includes a clause that calls upon the judiciary to decide when the context
requires exclusion of a listed instrument. The judiciary could conceivably decide that, when sold to sophisticated investors, none of the listed
instruments are securities under the statute. 372 Indeed, the caselaw sup-

ports this view: when only sophisticated investors generally purchase a
type of instrument, courts are more likely to consider that instrument not
a "security."

373

The cases reflect similar movement among courts forced to define
the term "tender offer."' 374 When Congress began to regulate these transactions, it intentionally refused to define the term, leaving the task to the
federal judiciary instead. 375 Under the courts' definition, a tender offer

will more likely exist when only sophisticated investors receive an offer to
purchase.3 7 6 Faced with such open provisions, the courts have moved

toward a scheme that might entirely exclude sophisticated investors from
the Williams Act's protections.
370. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1), 78c(a)(10) (1982).
371. As discussed supra note 303, Marc Steinberg and William Kaulbach have argued unpersuasively that the definitions of "security" found in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are not empty vessels at all,
because the definitions' "context clauses" were meant to refer to textual, not factual contexts.
372. Of course, before making such a sweeping pronouncement, any court would be guided by
prudence, and by such Supreme Court cases as Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686
(1985), in which the Court held that stock having all the attributes of common stock is always a
security. This Article merely suggests the theoretical legitimacy of such a judicial position.
373. See supra notes 301-13 and accompanying text; cf Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551
(1982). In Weaver, the Supreme Court held that a federally regulated bank's certificate of deposit is
not a security for purposes of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, in part because the banking regulations'
comprehensive scheme of protection make the protection of the securities laws unnecessary:
It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of
deposits are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws. We therefore hold that
the certificate of deposit purchased by the Weavers is not a security.
Id. at 559. The Weaver Court applied a judicially implied private right of action and developed a
definition of "security" under a clear congressional mandate that the judiciary make the law. For
both of these reasons, the Court acted legitimately in circumscribing that law in light of the plaintiff's need for protection. See also In re SSIW Corp., 7 Bankr. 735, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (in defining
term "general public" for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 101(39) (1982), court must determine whether
"particular class of persons affected" needs statute's protection).
374. See supra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
375. See T. HAZEN, supra note 146, § 11.13, at 348 ("The federal legislative pattern indicates a
congressional intent to retain a flexible definition and to leave the resolution of the issue to the SEC
and the federal judiciary."); Full Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subconm. on Securities of the Senate Comm on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 (1967).
376. See supra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the third category of judicially created law also limits the
extent to which the securities laws protect sophisticated investors. Federal judges are in a sense common law judges, giving substance to the
law, and shaping it in light of its purposes as they develop it against the
background of statutes. One might even say that common law judges
have an obligation to sculpt the law so that it yields no results inconsistent with policies behind a common law rule. Thus, even when the securities laws impose no textual constraints, courts must formulate judgemade securities law in a manner that reflects its motivating principles.
As a result, courts may deny legal protection to sophisticated investors if
a law is designed to protect only unsophisticated investors.
Of-course, nontextual development in the securities field is not common law in the same sense as the law passed on by the English Lords.
Reduced to its origins, federal securities law is statutory. Much of this
law, however, has developed independently of the original statutes. For
example, churning is illegal, purportedly under Rule lOb-5. 377 But judicial development of anti-churning rules has long taken place outside of
the Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, and at an even further remove from 1934
Act section 10(b), the statutory basis for Rule lOb-5. Although churning
may fit within the sweep of Rule 10b-5, and may involve a deceptive
practice for purposes of section 10(b), the judiciary has developed the law
on churning in the same way that it has developed constitutional equal
protection doctrine: the doctrine has a formal anchor in the text of the
rule, but is otherwise almost wholly judicially created, as though the statute has given rise to a body of common law. Given this judicial approach, courts may legitimately limit the application of churning laws in
light of the purposes behind their development; because courts created
the churning doctrine, they can limit it.
As the caselaw indicates, courts have done exactly that, limiting
churning actions to protect only those in need of protection: unsophisticated investors. Churning occurs only where a broker exercises actual or
de facto control over a customer's account. Except in those rare cases in
which a sophisticated investor has given a broker actual control over an
account, 378 courts are much less likely to allow a sophisticated investor
377. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
378. Courts recognize that if a sophisticated investor gives a broker actual control over trading
in an account, the investor's sophistication loses its legal relevance: a sophisticated investor who has

relinquished actual control of his account over to another is no different from the most unsophisticated investor. See Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983) (if investor

follows broker's advice, that proves element of control under churning claim, but is not determinative); Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1368 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's lack of
sophistication not an absolute requirement for churning claim); see also supra notes 129-41 and
accompanying text. The importance of treating sophisticated investors no differently from unsophis-
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to recover under a churning claim.
Similarly, courts have begun to recognize a "sophisticated investor
exception" to the rule of Wilko v. Swan, 379 another non-text-derived doctrine. Two Terms ago, in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon,
the Supreme Court undercut the Wilko doctrine, pointing out that its
rationales no longer have vitality, if indeed they ever did.3 80 Nonetheless, the Court suggested that Wilko might remain good law, not because
it was correctly decided, but because of strong notions of stare decisisitself a common law doctrine. 381 In this context, courts may freely limit
Wilko to protect only those unsophisticated investors unable to protect
themselves.
The common thread under this fourth proposition is the judicially
created nature of much securities law. Even though such law assumes
many forms, the principle remains the same: courts may limit judgemade law to protect only those whom courts deem in need of protection.
Thus, courts may legitimately refuse to apply judicially created securities
law for the protection of sophisticated investors. This is not to say, however, that judges should always refuse to apply such law to sophisticated
investors, a point that proposition five takes up.
5. Proposition Five: Recognizing Similarity in Dissimilarity.
Proposition five holds that in appropriate cases, courts may legitimately
decline to limit application ofjudge-made securities law to unsophisticated investors. In some situations, permitting sophisticated investors the
protection of judicially created law comports with the principles behind
the securities laws. Since investor sophistication does not invariably matter, courts have no reason to limit the securities laws' application in all
circumstances.
Courts would thus err in holding that sophisticated investors can
never sue under Rule lOb-5, even though courts may restrict implied private rights of action under the Rule. For example, in Rule lOb-5 omissions cases, where a sophisticated plaintiff alleges intentional withholding
of material information in the face of a duty to disclose, a court should
not preclude the sophisticated investor from recovering under Rule lOb5. Sophistication has no legal relevance unless an investor can put that
sophistication to use. As the court pointed out in McLean v. Alexander:
ticated investors when sophistication ceases to be legally relevant is discussed infra notes 380-84 and

accompanying text.
379. 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see supra note 176 and accompanying text.
380. See 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2341 (1987); see supra notes 357-64 and accompanying text.
381.

Term).

107 S. Ct. at 2338-43. But see supra note 174 (Supreme Court again reviewing Wilko this
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Sophisticated investors who possess either special expertise or the resources available to draw upon expertise, may be deemed to have
knowledge of certain investments and their attendant risks, whether in
fact they do or not and irrespective of whether material information
was actually disclosed. Likewise, persons with vast business experience are similarly charged with a high degree of knowledge. When,
however, there is no access to the criticalinformation nor opportunity382
to
discover the fraud, even the sophisticatedinvestor can be defraudedIn fact, in the 1934 Act, Congress itself recognized sophisticated inves383
tors' vulnerability to fraud by concealment.
Investor sophistication may also prove irrelevant in certain churning
cases. 384 As the First Circuit recognized in Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman,
Dillon & Co., "even a sophisticated investor who blindly relinquishes all
decisions to a broker may not be in actual control of his account. ' 385 As
these examples demonstrate, although courts may legitimately tailor judicially created law in light of its motivating principles, sophistication is
not always a relevant distinction.
Collectively, the five propositions discussed above justify disparate
treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated investors. The propositions apply to each of the areas discussed in part I and can resolve the
confusion and conflict that has pervaded the judicial treatment of sophisticated investors. As the propositions generally suggest, except where a
statute limits the courts, courts should treat the sophisticated investor
differently only to the extent that such treatment will bring the securities
laws' application in line with their motivating principles.
CONCLUSION

This Article has addressed several issues. It has pointed out that,
although the federal securities statutes make almost no distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, courts do treat them
differently. The Article has shown the wide variety of securities cases
that often turn on investor sophistication, and has demonstrated the confusion evident in the judicial treatment of these cases. That confusion
382. 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1078 (D. Del. 1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
383. See DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, supra note 237, at 50 ("No investor, no speculator can
safely buy and sell securities... without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to
the value of the securities he buys or sells." (quoting House report on 1934 Act)). Paradoxically, as
some commentators have suggested, the truly sophisticated investor makes the most of disclosure;
unsophisticated investors pay no attention to it. See Cohen, supra note 237, at 1351-55; see also Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (The unsophisticated investor "cannot by reading the prospectus discern the merit of the offering.").
384. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
385. 719 F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1983).
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results from two problems, both of which are remedied by the analytical
approach suggested in this Article.
First, courts have failed to realize that the issue of investor sophistication arises repeatedly in many different circumstances, a failure that
has prevented courts from drawing on important and helpful investor
sophistication cases in other areas of securities law. Second, courts have
articulated no unifying justification for their treatment of sophisticated
investors. In light of its consideration of the various investor sophistication cases, this Article supplies five propositions to guide judicial treatment of sophisticated investors in securities cases. Finally, the appendix
that follows presents a set of criteria to help both lawyers and judges
effectively evaluate investor sophistication.
To paraphrase Ernest Hemingway, sophisticated investors are different from you and me: they are more sophisticated.3 86 Although this realization only begins the inquiry into the relevance of investor
sophistication, it nevertheless turns out to be important. Sophisticated
investors are different, and that difference can determine whether a court
applies the federal securities laws or dismisses a complaint.

386. See E. HEMINGWAY, The Snows of Kilimanjaro, in THE FiFTH COLUMN AND THE FIRST
FORTY-NINE STORIES (1938):

The rich were dull and they drank too much ....
He remembered poor Julian and his
romantic awe of them and how he had started a story once that began, "The very rich are
different from you and me." And how someone had said to Julian, "Yes, they have more
money."
Interestingly, in the original publication of the story, the line attributed to the character Julian in the
passage was attributed to F. Scott Fitzgerald. See Hemingway, The Snows ofKilimanjaro, ESQUIRE,

Aug., 1936, at 27,200. Recent evidence suggests that Hemingway borrowed this famous line from

literary critic Mary Colum over lunch in 1936. See M. BRUCCOLI, SCOTT AND ERNEST 131 (1978).
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APPENDIX: CRITERIA OF INVESTOR SOPHISTICATION

As an American Bar Association committee once observed, sophisti387
cation "is a shorthand way of expressing a rather complex thought.
Although one might be tempted to suggest that the earmarks of sophistication should vary from situation to situation, it turns out that a set of
criteria applies almost uniformly in all the types of cases that part I of
this Article has discussed.
These criteria fall into three broad groups: (1) financial and business
acumen, (2) individual characteristics of sophistication, and (3) investment-specific behavior. Each of these groups also contains a checklist of
relevant considerations. It should be emphasized that these considerations are merely relevant, and none should determine the outcome of a
sophistication inquiry. Rather, courts should review the criteria as a
whole, shifting emphasis as appropriate from case to case.
A.

Financialand Business Acumen.

As a general matter, the most important single criterion of investor
sophistication is financial and business acumen, but this concept involves
a multifaceted inquiry. The following criteria play a role:
1. Investment Experience. An investor with many years of investment experience is more sophisticated than one without such
388
experience.
2. ProfessionalStatus. Doctors, lawyers, dentists, and other professionals are more sophisticated than nonprofessionals. 389 Of course,
387. Position Paper,supra note 247.
388. See Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1093-96 (4th Cir.
1979); Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 & n.10 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1002 (1973); Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1391, 1394 (D.
Md. 1986); Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931-32 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., 438
F. Supp. 199, 203-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377,
381 (N.D. Okla. 1975); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Pollak
v. Eastman Dillon, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,987, at 97,408
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1975); Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,760, at 96,500 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 376-77 (S.D. Tex. 1965). For a detailed analysis of this
criterion of sophistication in connection with the private offering exemption, see Soraghan, supra
note 134, at 24-25.
389. See, eg., Stem, 603 F.2d at 1093-96; Rivanna Trawlers Unltd. v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc.,
650 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); Xaphes v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 471, 481-82 (D. Me. 1986); Smith v. Sade & Co.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,846, at 94,338-43 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982);
Scarfarotti,438 F. Supp. at 203-05.
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professional status alone does not reveal very much; rather, it signals an
investor's education and income level.
3. History of Speculative Investments. Investors who have made
speculative investments are more sophisticated than those who have in
3 90
the past eschewed such risk.
4. Government or Business Experience. Such experience leads to
sophistication 39 1 by, for example, requiring investors to keep abreast of
3 92
world and financial developments.
5. Professional Experience in the Securities Industry. It hardly
needs saying that an investor employed as a stockbroker or national se393
curities exchange member is likely to be sophisticated.
6.

General Familiarity with Securities Transactions. An investor

who has general familiarity with securities transactions is more sophisticated than one without that familiarity.
B. Individual Characteristicsof Sophistication.

Some investors possess individual characteristics that indicate their
sophistication:
1. Understanding Trading in an Investment Account. Where a
complaint concerns activity in a brokerage account, a plaintiff's under390. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 53 & n.2 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Landry, 473 F.2d at 373 n.10; Scarfarotti 438 F. Supp. at 204.
391. Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361, 1363 (7th Cir. 1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Brooks, 548 F.2d 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1977); Rivanna Trawlers, 650 F.
Supp. at 1381; Xaphes, 632 F. Supp. at 481; South Carolina Nat'1 Bank v. Darmstadter, 622 F. Supp.
226, 231 (D.S.C. 1985), aff'd, 813 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); Sade
& Co., (1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,338-43; Barrett v. Triangle Mining
Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,438, at 99,211 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2,
1976).
392. See Sade & Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-) at 94,361.
393. See Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 1977); Goldberg v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 650 F. Supp. 222, 226 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Verace v. New York Stock
Exch., 478 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 402 F. Supp. 823,
824-25 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,987, at 97,408 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1975); see also Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 56, 58 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (investor's wife was broker); Note, Due Diligence
Requirement, supra note 53, at 773:
If the plaintiff... is actually engaged in the securities business, it is proper to presume that
the plaintiff has the expertise to understand the statements and recovery will be denied. If
the plaintiff is not a broker or regular speculator, then generally more evidence is required
before a court will hold that the plaintiff should have understood the confirmation slips.
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standing of that activity indicates sophistication. 394
2. Education. A highly educated investor is more sophisticated
than a poorly educated one. 395 Advanced degrees, particularly in busi3 96
ness or other financially related fields, are especially relevant.

3. Special Access to Information. In securities cases turning on
access to information, 397 an investor's special access to relevant informa398
tion makes him more sophisticated.

4. Intelligence. An investor with limited intellectual ability, unable to analyze available information, is less sophisticated than an intelli399
gent investor.

5. Age. The very old and the very young are particularly vulnerable to predation in securities transactions. 4 ° Thus, extremities of age

suggest a lack of sophistication.
6.

Wealth and Income.

In many cases, courts have suggested

that high income levels or wealth indicate sophistication. 4° 1 In fact,
Congress and the SEC have taken the position that wealthy individuals

do not need the protections offered by registration of securities under the
394. See Brooks, 548 F.2d at 616; Landry, 473 F.2d at 373 n.10; Sade & Co., [1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) at 94,345-55; Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
518 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
395. See Costello, 711 F.2d at 1363; Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 635
F. Supp. 1391, 1393 (D. Md. 1986); South CarolinaNat'lBank, 622 F. Supp. at 231; Leib v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Barrett v. Triangle
Mining Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,438, at 99,211 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Pollak [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,408 n.2; Gammage v.
Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,760, at 96,500
(S.D. Cal. June 13, 1974).
396. See Barrett, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 99,211; Pollak [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97,408 n.2; Gammage, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 96,500.
397. See, e.g., supra notes 241-67 and accompanying text (discussing private offering exemption
under section 4(2) of 1933 Act).
398. See, e.g., Rochambeau v. Brent Exploration, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 381, 385 (D. Colo. 1978) (interpreting exemption from Colorado filing requirement).
399. See Nunes, 635 F. Supp. at 1394 (citing Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673,
677 (9th Cir. 1982)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 376
(S.D. Tex. 1965).
400. See, e.g., Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); Bocock, 247 F. Supp. at 376-77.
401. See, eg., Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 471,481 (D.
Me. 1986); see also Position Paper,supra note 247, at 491-95 (discussing relevance of wealth in
private offering exemption); Soraghan, supra note 134, at 41 (same).
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1933 Act. 40 2 Although courts should consider an investor's ability to

bear economic risk, they should also be sensitive to the fact that rich
investors can do stupid things. 40 3 Indeed, the wealthy but naive investor
4°4
is arguably the most vulnerable to securities fraud.

C. Investment-Specific Behavior.
How an investor behaves with respect to her investments indicates

her degree of sophistication. Relevant types of behavior follow:
1. Regular Consultation with Investment Professionals. Confer-

ring regularly with a broker or other investment advisor indicates an in4°5
vestor's sophistication.
2. Number of Brokerage Accounts.

Maintaining several broker-

4 °6
age accounts over time indicates sophistication.

3. Stock Club Membership.
4 7
suggests sophistication. 0

Membership in an investment pool

4. Amount of Money Invested. Some investors put hundreds of
thousands or even millions of dollars at risk in securities investments;
such investments show sophistication, 4° s but subject to the above cau-

tionary remarks about the criteria of wealth and income. 40 9

5. Scrutiny over Investment Accounts. An investor who diligently
4 10
monitors the trading in her investment account is sophisticated.
402. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1982) (registration exemption for sales solely to "accredited investors," who are either wealthy or institutional); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505, .506 (1988) (registration exemption for sales to limited numbers of investors, with "accredited investors" not included in total).
403. See Privatizing Disputes, supra note 167, at 429-30.

404. See id. at 430.
405. See Zandman v. Joseph, 102 F.R.D. 924, 931-32 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Helfand v. Cenco, Inc.,
80 F.R.D. 1, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 381
(N.D. Okla. 1975).
406. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 53 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978); Marshak, 413 F. Supp. at 381.
407. See, e.g., Marshak, 413 F. Supp. at 381.
408. See Stem v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1093-97 (4th Cir.
1979) (hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of options trades); Rol, 570 F.2d at 53 & n.2
($2,000,000 invested); Zandman, 102 F.R.D. at 931-32 (approxiately $3,000,000 invested).
409. See supra text accompanying notes 400-01.
410. See Rol, 570 F.2d at 53 & n.2; Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 632
F. Supp. 471, 481 (D. Me. 1986).
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6. Attending Investment Conferences. At least one court has
found investors' attendance of investment seminars and conferences rele4 11
vant to their sophistication.
7. Subscribing to Financialor Investment Journals. A staggering
number of periodicals-such as-The Wall Street Journal,Barron's,Investor's Daily, Forbes, Business Week, Financial World, Fortune, as well
as the many investment advisory services like Value Line-are targeted
at investors. An investor who subscribes to, or regularly reads, such pub4 12
lications is sophisticated.
8. Viewing Financial Television Programming. Similarly, an investor who watches the Financial News Network, The Nightly Business
41 3
Report, Wall Street Week, or similar programs is sophisticated.
9. Reviewing Confirmation Slips or Monthly Statements. Investors who review post-trade confirmation slips and read monthly statements are sophisticated. 41 4 Some courts have even found sophistication
based solely on a plaintiff's receipt of confirmation slips or monthly
statements. 41 5 Such a finding, however, goes too far. A court may consider receipt of such slips or statements to determine whether an investor
should be estopped from complaining of transactions described in the
slips or statements, but mere receipt of these materials has no relevance
to sophistication.
D.

The Special Status of InstitutionalInvestors.

The appropriateness of presuming that all institutional investors are
sophisticated deserves one final word. Such a presumption should exist,
and it should be a conclusive presumption. As Dean Robert Clark has
written: "Institutional investors are usually sophisticated and powerful
enough to demand and get the information they need before committing
their money. The legal system does not have to protect them with a
411. See Zandman, 102 F.R.D. at 931-32.

412. See Landry v. Hemphill, Noyes & Co., 473 F.2d 365, 373 n.10 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1002 (1973); Xaphes, 632 F. Supp. at 481; Smith v. Sade & Co., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 98,846, at 94,361 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 56, 58 (E.D. Mo. 1980); Helfand v. Cenco, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 1, 7
(N.D. Ill. 1977); Marshak v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 413 F. Supp. 377, 381 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
413. See, e.g., Xaphes, 632 F. Supp. at 481.
414. See Landry, 473 F.2d at 373 n.10; Xaphes, 632 F. Supp. at 481; Sade & Co., [1982 Transfer

Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,345, 94,350; Altschul v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis
Inc., 518 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
415. See Marshak 413 F. Supp. at 381; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock,
247 F. Supp. 373, 376-78 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
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superimposed mandatory disclosure system. ' 4 16
Indeed, courts seem inclined to consider institutional investors at
least prima facie sophisticated. 4 17 Even Congress 418 and the SEC4 19 have
recently taken positions indicating their views that institutional investors
are especially sophisticated. Although some institutions may lack sophistication in investment matters, 4 20 the law should encourage them to
have sophisticated parties invest on their behalf.

416. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 730 (1986).
417. See, e.g., J.H. Cohn & Co. v. American Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 998 (7th Cir.
1980); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd,
651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. CurtissWright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 961 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d
Cir. 1978); Seiden v. Nicholson, 72 F.R.D. 201, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Pierre J. LeLandais & Co. v.
MDS-Atron, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also McConnell v. Surak, 774 F.2d
746, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Illinois statute that provides for registration exemption in cases
of sales to "sophisticated investors," a term that automatically includes certain institutions).
418. See 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 386 (Mar. 13, 1987) (House subcommittee
report questions relevance of traditional notions of shareholder protection where market dominated
by sophisticated institutional investors).
419. See 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1245 (Aug. 14, 1987) (new Rule 144A would
allow resales of unregistered securities to qualified institutional investors in recognition that such
investors do not need protection of registration); 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 85 (Jan. 16,
1987) (proposed Regulation D changes would provide for exempt sales to employee stock option
plans); see also 20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 6 (Jan. 8, 1988) (American Stock Exchange
requests SEC approval for SITUS (System for Institutional Trading of Unregistered Securities),
which would permit domestic trading of unregistered foreign securities by institutional investors,
who "do not require the protection of the registration and periodic reporting provisions of the U.S.
securities laws.").
420. See, e.g., Welch Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1399 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).

